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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the relationship between religion and the s
tate in
Enlightenment Europe as articulated by John Locke, Benedict de Spinoz
a and Jean
Jacques Rousseau. I conduct the study focusing mainly on the primary t
exts of the
above-mentioned theorists. Locke and Spinoza conceived of toleration to
be the best
way in which religion and the secular state could peacefully co-exist, eve
n though
they differed considerably in their respective understanding of the conce
pt. Locke
conceived of toleration using a moderate theological framework, predom
inantly
paying attention to freedom of worship and the separate spheres of influ
ence for
religion and the state. On the other hand, Spinoza was radically secular
in his
interpretation focusing mainly on the freedom of thought, speech and ev
en the
press.
Rousseau provided the main alternative to Locke and Spinoza's ideas on
toleration.
His understanding of the most effective relationship between religion and
the state
revolved around the implementation of a civil religion. This would be a re
ligion based
on civil principles. Rousseau argued that good citizenship, a good lawgiv
er,
patriotism, the doctrine of separation of powers and an elective aristocra
cy were
important for his ideas on civil religion to function effectively.
Given the context of Enlightenment Europe, this dissertation concludes t
hat
toleration, or more exactly Locke's version of it, now forms the foundatio
n of most
Western secular states. This is because it did not digress from the most
important
aspects of contemporary religious doctrine.
Contents
Introduction and Methodology
Chapter 1: Locke on the relationship between religion and the state
Chapter 2: The Enlightenment battle for toleration between Spinoza
and Locke











Prior to the creation of the secular state, many parts of Europe were sev
erely
affected by wars between different religious sects. The most famous of t
hese
religious wars was between the Catholics and Protestants in what becam
e known as
the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. The
Thirty Years
War that ensued between 1618 and 1648 had devastating impacts for E
urope. After
the Peace of Westphalia was negotiated and signed, international vocab
ulary was
re-orientated away from Christianity towards a secular society of autonom
ous states.
As Jackson and Owens (2005,53) state: 'In the modern era, secular pol
itics and
particularly the politics of the state and the art of statecraft, was liberated
from the
moral inhibitions and religious constraints of medieval Christianity'.
Jonathan Israel has stated that several theologians fought bravely to pre
vent these
catastrophic new secular and radical ideas. He goes on to argue that Sp
inoza's
ideas formed the backbone of the radical confrontation between the auth
ority of
religion and the state. Spinoza has argued that nothing rests on God's
commandments. He went to the extent of arguing that God preordains n
o institutions
or divine laws. This in essence meant that the only authenticity for politic
s is the
individual's self interest.
Israel also writes about the manner in which theorists of the Enlightenme
nt era
described the new ideas. First and foremost, these new ideas had many
political
elites in a dilemma. Nevertheless, it was in particular these elites who m
oulded,
supervised and pre-determined the contours of popular culture, which m
eant that the
common folk could not be safeguarded from this extraordinary philosoph
ical
revolution. The European intellectual arena grew more complex, fragmen
ted and
uncertain even though this revolution overtook the religious fraternity. On
the other
hand, moderate Enlightenment thinkers placed enormous emphasis on t
he necessity
to triumph over the increasing disintegration of ideas, and by means of c
oncrete
demonstrations and solid arguments, re-establish secure and lasting stru
ctures of
authority, legitimacy, knowledge and faith. The principle endeavour of th
e moderate
Enlightenment thinkers was to triumph over lack of knowledge and super
stition,
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institute toleration and revolutionise ideas in such a manner as to protect and
maintain crucial elements of the older arrangement. It was argued that this
arrangement would provide a practicable combination between reason and faith. The
radical thinkers discarded the idea of finding the middle ground and wanted to
remove the prevailing structure immediately and completely.
Modern society has over the course of the last few centuries subsequently evolved
into what we today term as the Western secular state. The majority of countries in
the world are governed according to secular principals and doctrines such as
democracy, human rights and the separation of powers. The establishment of
international organisations such as United Nations are aimed at ensuring that the
international society of states deeply entrench the values of democracy, human
rights and equality. Politics and religion have thus come to be separated with each
considered to have their own spheres of influence or even no influence at all.
Religion is now assumed to be a matter of inward concern (in other words, an aspect
of an individual's personal life) and politics is given to form part of an individuals
outward being, that of his relationship with the state and society at large. This is
assumed to be the ideal relationship for the peaceful co-existence of these two
important spheres of society. The eventual success of the Western secular state has
had its phases of successes and difficulties but in general, the formation of the
secular state is considered an exceptional accomplishment.
Nevertheless, the Western secular state seems to be experiencing a 'returning to the
roots phenomenon' or what political theorists term as 'the return of the sacred'.
Those academics who argue that religion is still important in the twenty first century
have pointed towards the numerous conflicts in the world that are strongly claimed to
possess religious undertones. This has made many people sceptical of religion and
many have even begun attacking theologians claim to power. The occurrences of
September 11 th 2001, the War in Iraq and the devastating civil war it has brewed,
and the London bombings of 7 July 2005, are considered by many as the most
pertinent evidence of the 'return of the sacred'. Academics also consider it evidence
that the distinction between religion and the state might not be so clear-cut.
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What we are also seeing in the contemporary world is a tremendous amount of
research being done around the issues of religion and the various doctrines and
pillars of the secular state. Issues surrounding sacredness have transcended
science (e.g. stem-cell research), animals, wars, and politics and so on. Academics
have taken a special interest in the sacred since it has is becoming hugely
influential, persistent and commanding in the lives of the majority of the world's
population. Those theorists concerned with issues of the sacred hold contrasting
views concerning their understanding of secularisation and the role theology plays in
comprehending the sacred. A certain section of academics have even argued in
favour of the superiority of religion in comprehending secularisation (Farneti 2008,
23).
The general viewpoint amongst academics concerning the return of the sacred is
that it is an endeavour to provide fresh meanings to a world that has lost its morals,
ethics and, in general, its peace of mind (Farneti 2008, 25). Most theologians argue
that religion can fill this important void created by secularisation. Conversely,
secularists have argued that secularisation 'gives rise to the victory of the non-
religious man, that is, to a man who rejects the sacrality of the world, who accepts
only a profane existence, divested of all religious presuppositions' (Eliade 1968, 5
cited in Farneti 2008, 25). The central principle of this argument is that the Western
secular state has managed to weaken theological elements such as family
relationships, the relationship between men and women and traditional languages.
According to this familiar approach to secularisation:
Secularisation is the overcoming of a previous condition in which religion controlled and
dominated public life. Secularisation, therefore, is not an event that has been completed
once and for all, but a sort of unfinished project, an occurrence that is always under way.
According to this view we have a quasi-coincidence between the 'sacred' and 'religion'
and the only viable response to their untimely return is to show people that their claims of
control are epistemically untenable (Farneti 2008, 25-26).
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Another political theorist, James Cochrane, has analysed the importance of the
sacred within the context of the health sector. This sector has often been
characterised by diverse views of religion, which has added to the confusion of many
people concerning important issues such as HIV/AIDS and other STDs. Although
confusion may have arisen in many issues, Cochrane argues that the significance
(negative and positive) of religion to the health sector should not be downplayed
(Cochrane 2008, 70). Some religions and traditions have impacted negatively on the
HIV/AIDS pandemic with respect to promoting the stigma attached to those affected
by the disease. For example, some religions and traditions can 'impact negatively
through oppressive gender constructs on women, or constrain good public practice
through questionable ideologies as in the case of the USA's PEPFAR (the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) constraints on condomisation'
(Cochrane 2008, 70).
As can be expected in the post-Enlightenment world, research on the negative
impact of religion occurs in abundance. On the other hand, Cochrane (2008, 70)
argues that although theology may possess numerous confusing elements and have
certain negative effects on society, it can also have positive impacts (and he for the
most part focuses on the positives) on the health sector that 'might begin to frame a
policy and practice that allows for an appreciative, though not na'ive or uncritical,
alignment between public health systems and religious or faith-based initiatives'. He
believes that if religion begins to play an important role in the health sector, it would
result in sustainable and equitable health care sectors in Africa. Theologians believe
that religion can also play a positive role in the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
The prophetic religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism all argue against the sex
before marriage, which many secularists believe can have favourable impacts
against HIV/AIDS.
The return of the sacred has also re-ignited debates amongst some political theorists
as to the most effective arrangement between religion and the state. These debates
have their origins in Enlightenment Europe and it is during this period that this
dissertation will focus upon. The foremost proponents in the debate were John
Locke, Benedict de Spinoza and Jean Jacques Rousseau. This dissertation will
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focus on their conception of the relationship between religion and the state. Locke
and Spinoza argued in favour of an arrangement that involved toleration, although
the two differed with regards to their conception of the term, whilst Rousseau
possessed alternative civil religion ideas.
Chapter one focuses on Locke's conception of toleration and effectively his
conception of the relationship between religion and the state. Given the turbulent
context of the seventeenth century, Locke bravely wrote at the onset of A Letter
Concerning Toleration that 'I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristical
mark of a true church' (1667 [2007], 23). He belonged to the moderate branch of the
Enlightenment since he envisaged an arrangement of society in which both religion
and the state could exist in harmony. Locke argued in favour of a theological
conception because he believed that religion was absolutely instrumental to the
state. Nevertheless, he held that both religion and the state should have their
respective spheres of influence with religion belonging to an individual's private
realm and issues regarding the state being an individual's public concern. This
chapter shall first discuss the arguments on toleration that existed during the
Enlightenment era in general, then Locke's conception of toleration. It also
investigates how his thoughts on toleration fit into his broader political philosophy. In
essence, this means investigating whether a relationship exists between property
and toleration. Locke's conception of toleration had three limitations, which will be
discussed in detail in the opening chapter. Finally, the chapter will highlight the
structure of government Locke thought to be most beneficial for his account of
toleration and subsequently to society at large.
The main contribution of Spinoza to the Enlightenment was his ability to incorporate
into a single coherent arrangement, the foremost fundamentals of ancient, modern
and oriental atheism. He argues that religion is at the bottom of a psychological
course of action, natural in origin and thought processes, which became distorted
into superstition. Numerous thinkers have also explained natural disasters as the
wrath of God on the wrongdoers. Spinoza emphatically disagrees with this and
argues that natural disasters also have an effect on religious citizens (Israel
2001 :230-232). With this in mind, chapter two investigates Spinoza's understanding
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of the relationship between religion and the state. In stark contrast to Locke, Spinoza
possessed a radically secular understanding of toleration. Freedom of thought and
speech as opposed to salvation of souls is the chief concern of Spinoza. The
similarities and differences between Locke's and Spinoza's understanding of
toleration and subsequently on their relationship between religion and the state will
be discussed at length in this chapter. Spinoza's conception of freedom and his
political ideas will be discussed since they build up to his arguments on religion and
toleration. Spinoza also ventured into a direction that not many other theorists,
including Locke, dared to go. He promoted the freedom to publish views and argued
that his secular toleration ideas can best be achieved within a democratic
dispensation. This chapter will also investigate which theorist's conception of
toleration became the dominant conception and which now forms the basis of most
Western secular states.
Jean Jacques Rousseau was another influential thinker of the Enlightenment and I
discuss his alternative thoughts concerning the relationship between religion and the
state in chapter three. In the Social Contract, Rousseau sets out to investigate
whether a just and equitable state can be achieved. This is effectively Rousseau's
task in articulating an understanding of the relationship between religion and the
state. This is an arrangement that involves the state being governed by a religion of
civil principles, which Rousseau refers to as a civil religion. Rousseau argues that
religion is absolutely instrumental to the formation of any state but opposed pagan
religions and the prophetic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam for reasons
that will be discussed in this chapter. Rousseau's idea of a civil religion is essentially
an attempt to return to the ancient idea of cementing good citizenship in faith. In
book two, chapter seven of the Social Contract, he suggests that lawgivers often
invent supernatural origins for the laws for a similar reason and if people believe that
the laws came from the Gods, they will be less likely to violate them. His civil religion
is not very complicated. It is not caught up in a great deal of dogma, and is merely
intended to ensure that the citizens remain productive and obedient. Still, during an
age when religion has been effectively divorced from the state in most developed
countries, the attempt to bring them back together might seem uncomfortable. The
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notion of worshipping the state also seems disturbingly totalitarian. All this will be
discussed in detail in this chapter.
Rousseau's broader political philosophy will be discussed in detail since it provides
the backbone of his ideas on civil religion. He places huge emphasis on the
importance of patriotism, citizenship, the necessity of a good lawgiver, the doctrine
of separation of powers and of elective aristocracies for the successful functioning of
his civil religion ideas. Thus this chapter will investigate how these important
elements come together in his civil religion ideas.
The main reason the aforementioned theorists (or at least Locke and Rousseau)
were chosen was because of the important role they played in shaping the modern
state. The influence of Locke on the American Revolution and Rousseau on the
French Revolution cannot be underestimated and the conclusion shall briefly
investigate this link. The American and French Revolutions are perhaps two of the
most influential events in shaping the secular nature of the modern state. The
thoughts on toleration that were debated during the Enlightenment culminated in
Locke and the civil religion ideas in Rousseau. The next section shall deal with the
methodology used in this dissertation.
Methodology
This dissertation is a historical and philosophical analysis. It is an attempt to grasp
the intellectual origins of a set of ideas that were of great significance to the
development of the modern state. I will be using a mixture of intellectual history and
genealogy, the latter inspired by the works of Nietzsche and Foucault. The main
sources are a set of primary texts coupled with secondary texts that will be used to
gauge a good sense of the contexts in which the thinkers wrote.
In this dissertation I am going to interpret the various texts within their specific
historical context provided by scholars of the Cambridge school such as Dunn,
Skinner, Silverthorne and Tuck, as opposed to imposing modern theories on ancient
texts. Chief amongst them, Quentin Skinner, sets out to find an appropriate manner
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in which to analyse ancient texts. I will defend the aforementioned approach
because of the numerous problems associated with other approaches, most of which
will be discussed in detail under this section. Skinner is the main theorist that
criticises the dominant methods of understanding classic texts. He begins by
attacking those who argue that classic texts are timeless classics or ideas that are of
universal relevance. On the contrary, Skinner argues that:
The belief that classical theorists can be expected to comment on a determinant set of
fundamental concepts has given rise, it seems to me, to a series of confusions and
exegetical absurdities that have bedevilled the history of ideas for too long (2002,57-58).
Some of these confusions arise from the fact that intellectual historians argue that it
is impossible to study classical texts only in light of texts itself since we always bring
into the equation our own pre-judgments concerning possible meanings of the texts.
The ensuing predicament is that pre-judgments and perceptions may cloud our
judgments when approaching classical texts since they will act as the determining
factors of what we think and observe. Hence, the danger of pursuing the timeless
classical approach of historical texts is that we might impose meanings on them that
the theorists of these texts could not have accepted as an accurate account (Skinner
2002, 58-59).
Skinner argues that a more appropriate term to describe the 'historical absurdities'
mentioned above is mythology since they are extremely far from the truth. The
dominant and most common mythology that exists in history is the assumption that
every writer of ancient texts (for example in political theory) has articulated doctrines
on all the subject matter that is said to make up that field (Skinner 2002, 59). Skinner
believes that this results in a 'mythology of doctrines' that occurs in several ways. He
states:
First there is the danger of converting some scattered or incidental remarks by a classic
theorist into their 'doctrine'. This in turn has the effect of generating two particular kinds of
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historical absurdity. One is more characteristic of intellectual biographies and synoptic
histories of thought, in which the focus is on the individual thinkers. The other is more
characteristic of 'histories of ideas' in which the special focus is on the development of
some 'unit idea' itself (2002, 60).
This dissertation will be careful not to credit 'a writer with a meaning they could have
not intended to convey' (Skinner 2002, 61) because of the numerous problems that
will be mentioned. This is because the intellectual biography approach mentioned
thus far also possesses the danger of anachronism, which is a danger that I have
taken extra special care not to succumb to. Skinner uses the example of the
medieval political historian, Marsilius of Padua, to illustrate his point. Marsilius of
Padua, in his Defensor Pacis, spoke of the different roles of the rulers and people.
He argued that the executive role belonged to the rulers and the legislative role to
the people. Any political commentator will immediately gauge that this is a reference
to the modern doctrine of separation of powers. It is impossible, however, to analyse
Marsilius of Padua in relation to the doctrine of separation of powers since he could
not have contributed to a debate that did not occur in the context in which he was
living in (Skinner 2002, 60). Modern political commentators will point out that the
doctrine of separation of powers only became widely accepted and debated since
the American Revolution that separated the executive from the legislative branch of
government. Moreover, the origins of this important doctrine can only be traced to
the instance of the collapse of the Roman Republic into an Empire which occurred
two centuries after Marsilius' death and which demonstrated the dangers present in
centralised power (Skinner 2002, 60).
It is important to take note of the fact that every theorist lived in a certain context and
could have only contributed to debates within that context and not to the works and
debates of future theorists. Hence, this dissertation will take special care not to fall
into the fallacy of crediting doctrines to thinkers that could not have conceptualised
them. In making his point, Skinner argues that the 'mythology of doctrines' can
further be understood through the 'histories of ideas' approach. The mistake
intellectual historians usually make here is to 'speak as if the developed form of the
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doctrine has always in some sense been immanent in history, even if the various
thinkers failed to 'hit upon it', even if it 'dropped from sight' at various times, even if
an entire era failed to 'rise to a consciousness' of it (Skinner 2002, 62). The
insinuations of these have two potential forms of historical absurdity. Firstly, this
search for approximations has resulted in an approach to the study of intellectual
history in which there is this almost constant search for earlier approximations or
anticipations of later doctrines. Skinner provides numerous examples to elucidate
the point he makes here. Some historians argue that Machiavelli's thought can be
considered important because he prepared the basis for Marx's thought, that the
works of Marsilius of Padua is important because of the exceptional anticipation of
Machiavelli or that Lord Shaftesbury anticipated Kant (Skinner 2002,63).
Connected to the fallacy mentioned above is what Skinner refers to as a 'unit idea'.
The tendency by numerous intellectual historians here is to search for the true
origins of doctrines and whether such doctrines exist in the works of a given theorist.
He uses the familiar example of the doctrine of separation of powers to give
pertinence to what he is saying. Skinner says:
Is the doctrine already 'there' in the works of George Buchanan? No, for he 'did not fully
articulate' it, although none came closer at the time. But is it perhaps 'there' by the time
we come to the constitutional proposals put forward by the royalists in the English civil
war? No, for it is still 'not a pure doctrine' (2002, 63).
In this dissertation, I also aim to discuss all universally agreed doctrines of a subject
and theorist. Any contrary approach would result in the second manifestation of the
mythology of doctrines outlined by Skinner. He argues that Marsilius of Padua would
have agreed with democratic rule since he believed in a form of sovereignty that
belonged to the people. He also argues that although Thomas Aquinas did not
discuss the subject of civil disobedience, we can be certain that he would not have
sanctioned it (Skinner 2002,64).
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This dissertation will stick to the core concerns and issues raised by the various
theorists and not chastise them for their supposed shortcomings. This is another
version of the mistake mentioned in the previous paragraph that intellectual
historians tend to make when they pick out a certain doctrine that a theorist should
have brought out and subsequently chastise them for their shortcoming (Skinner
2002, 65). Skinner uses the issues of voting and decision-making to clarify his point
here. Intellectual historians and modern commentators have criticised 'Plato's
Republic, for 'omitting' the 'influence of public opinion' or from criticising John
Locke's Two Treatises for omitting 'all references to family and race' and failing to
make it 'wholly clear' where he stands on the question of universal suffrage' (Sabine
1951, Aaron 1955 and Friedrich 1964 cited in Skinner 2002, 66). The overall
concerns of both Plato and Locke differed markedly from the concerns raised above
thus, they could not articulated opinions on these issues.
Sticking to what classic theorists have articulated will be a fundamental concern of
this study. We cannot criticise ancient writers about their works not being their most
efficient contribution that they were capable of making to their discipline. Skinner
argues the real question that should be raised is whether 'these writers ever
intended, or could have intended, to do what they are castigated for not having done'
(2002, 67). Some intellectual historians point out whether Locke's Two Treatises
comprises of all the doctrines he could have hoped to contribute to. For example,
they argue as to why in his discussion on 'natural law and political society' he fails to
'advocate a world state' (Dahl 1963 cited in Skinner 2002, 67). Intellectual historians
who have gone further have committed a grave error in their analysis.
When explaining the relevance of a particular text to the dissertation (especially in
the earlier stages), I aim to leave as room as possible to analysing what the author
might have meant or planned. Analysis to the contrary, Skinner argues, will result in
the mythology of prolepsis. In short, this is the crucial mistake that the intellectual
historian makes when he is more interested in the significance of the text than what
the author might have intended to mean by the text (Skinner 2002, 72-73). Let's take
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Jean Jacques Rousseau as a case in point. Numerous intellectual historians have
argued that Rousseau's political ideas justify totalitarianism as well as democracy.
The significance of the Rousseau's work might well be totalitarian or democratic but
this definitely was not the intention of Rousseau at the time he wrote the texts
(Skinner 2002, 73). In fact, democracy and totalitarianism were terms of art or
conceived as feasible regime types generally, at the time, and specifically by
Rousseau himself.
The numerous fallacies that intellectual historians commit when analysing classic
texts have been discussed in some detail. This dissertation will take special care in
ensuring that the aforementioned mistakes are not committed. Rather, given the
short scope of this study, I will focus on the particular historical context the particular
theorist wrote since there are numerous fallacies (all mentioned above) that might
occur if this method is not followed.
To achieve the best possible result from the study of the history of ideas, I will also
use Skinner's main method of analysis. Skinner argues that we should not merely
provide an analysis of what the classic writer exactly meant by his texts, but also
provide an understanding of what the writer may have said and how this meaning
was intended by the writer to be understood (Skinner 2002, 79). Skinner states:
To understand a text must at least be to understand both the intention to be understood
and the intention that this intention be understood, which the text as an intended act of
communication must be embodied. The question we accordingly need to confront in
studying these texts is what their authors - writing at the time when they wrote for the
specific audience they had in mind - could in practice have intended to communicate by
issuing their given utterances (2002, 86-87).
The focus of study must therefore be fundamentally linguistic. Additionally, the
methodology being used must have as its focal point the possible intentions of the
given author. After this, an analysis of the social context in which the text occurs
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within the linguistic enterprise mentioned above. This social context is of utmost
importance since it assists in deciding 'what conventionally recognisable meanings it
might in principal have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate'
(Skinner 2002, 87). Although the linguistic focus of the study is important, this study
is also institutional and practice based. The settings of the various discourses will
also assist in gaining a holistic understanding of the respective authors' ideas.
The value of analysing the history of ideas is the interplay between philosophical
analysis and historical evidence. Skinner argues that 'the study of statements uttered
in the past raises special issues, and might yield insights of corresponding
philosophical interest' (2002, 87). He speaks about the phenomenon of conceptual
innovation and the connection between linguistic and ideological change that could
be better studied through the studying the history of ideas. Skinner also says the fact
that classic texts might have their own particular historical context, does not make
them irrelevant for our own analysis. Conversely, classic texts can assist us in
revealing the variety of 'moral assumptions and political commitments' (Skinner
2002,88).
This study also involves genealogy, which is a method of studying history and the
history of institutions. We do not necessarily need to know the true intentions of the
authors, but rather to understand them as part of a larger intellectual history. The
task of providing a genealogy is concentrated towards narrating this history as wholly
as possible. In essence, due attention must be given to as many of the appropriate
aspects as possible (Geuss 2005, 158-159). Rabinow argues that genealogy
'operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have
been scratched over and recopied many times' (1984, 76). The genealogical task will
require tremendous amount of patience, perseverance, knowledge and attention to
minute detail. Genealogy does not aim to fix or finish unfinished business of the past,
it does not hope to show that the present has elements of the past in it, it does not
hope to demonstrate the gradual evolution of a doctrine such as the separation of
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powers nor does it hope to predict the future because of the analysis of past events
(Rabinow 1984, 81). On the contrary, the genealogical task hopes to:
Follow the complex course of descent which is to maintain passing events in their proper
dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the
complete reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave
birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that the
truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority
of accidents (Rabinow 1984, 81).
The starting point is the nature of present institutions. In this instance we need to
start from the Western secular state. Nietzsche provides an example of Christianity
for his genealogy. He starts from the present by outlining the bi-partite structure of
Christianity: 'a set of antecedently existing practices, modes of behaviour,
perception, and feeling which at a certain time are given an interpretation, which
imposes on them a meaning, they did not have before' (Geuss 1999, 9). A
genealogy is to present a 'historical dissolution of self-evident identities' (Geuss
2005, 157). Hence, with reference to Christianity, Nietzsche differentiates between
the teachings of Jesus Christ and a particular understanding placed on his teachings
that have ultimately turned out to be the content of Christianity. He concludes that
'the history of Christianity is a history of successive attempts on the part of a variety
of 'wills' to take control of and reinterpret a complex of habits, feelings, ways of
perceiving and acting, thereby imposing on this complex a 'meaning" (Geuss
1999,12). In short, genealogy aims to argue that institutions, religions, doctrines and
so on are not necessarily the unified and coherent entities they are sometimes made
out to be. To summarise how genealogy can be used to analyse texts, Geuss (1999,
14) states:
Starting from the present day of, say, Christianity (or of whatever else is the object of
genealogical analysis), the genealogy works its way backward in time, recounting the
episodes of struggle between different wills, each trying to impose its interpretation or
meaning on the Christianity that existed at the time, and thereby disentangling the
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separate strands of meaning that have come together in a unity in the present. Each such
episode is, as it were, the branching node of a genealogical tree.
In keeping with Nietzsche's example of Christianity, genealogy is not interested in
investigating whether an individual is remorseful for his transgressions but rather
with asking the important question of how these terms such as sin, remorse,
punishment and so on have become acknowledged as unanimously compulsory to
all (Geuss 2005, 158). In essence, genealogy is not interested in justification but
rather with explanation or as Geuss (1999, 3) puts it: 'genealogy is certainly not
undertaken with the intention of legitimising any present institution, practice, or
institution, and won't in general have the effect of enhancing the standard of any
contemporary item'. Thus, I will take special care not to legitimise any institutions,
doctrines and thoughts of the three principal theorists being used. Rather, I will focus
on peeling away the complex layers of their works to gain a holistic and appropriate
understanding. For example, I will read Rousseau in the context of his time
(eighteenth century) as well as in the context of his readings of Hobbes, Locke, and
Spinoza etc, trying to figure out the true nature of his thoughts.
To summarise, the approach to the study of intellectual history this dissertation will
use involves searching for possible meaning to texts and not necessarily their exact
meanings, taking into account context, as suggested by Skinner. The focus will
predominantly be linguistic taking into account that the study is also institutional and
practice based. I will not utilise other approaches because of the various dangers (as
mentioned extensively above) they pose. Finally, this dissertation also requires a
genealogical analysis. A genealogy effectively allows the philosopher or historian to
peel away the immense layers of history, paying attention to detail and eventually
hope to sift out the truth amongst a host of competing agendas.
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Chapter One
Locke on the relationship between religion and the state
The Enlightenment era was characterised by intense debate regarding the
relationship between religion and the state. Some theorists argued that religion
should not play a part in society because of the tremendous pain and suffering that it
had brought to Europe. Others believed that an amicable solution could be sought so
that religion and secularity could peacefully co-exist. John Locke was one such
theorist and perhaps the most prominent, who debated over the potential peaceful
relationship between religion and the state. Locke was probably the most influential
theorist of the seventeenth century and was the first theorist of the Enlightenment
era to clearly articulate a conception of toleration. His two great works, the Two
Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration form the backbone of
his thoughts on the relationship between religion and the state. A tremendous
amount of research has been done regarding the political thought of John Locke.
The internal growth of this thought is studied extensively. For example, John Dunn
argues that Locke's politics in the Two Treatises are explained by elements of his
own thought, in partiCUlar, that of his religious commitments. Other thinkers state that
the Second Treatise was partly formed by Locke's participation in justifying and
actively setting up armed struggle to Charles 11 (Marshall 1994, xvi). The concept of
toleration has been regarded by many as one of the foundations of the Western
secular state.
Locke's conception of toleration cannot be taken at surface value and requires much
in-depth critical analysis. With this in mind, the present chapter aims to set out
Locke's views on toleration, the limitations imposed by him on toleration and the
reasons for these limitations before arguing in subsequent chapters that it provides
(although not in the manner Locke conceived it) the foundations of the Western
secular state. Part of the investigation will also require a specific and detailed
exegesis of Locke's argument on toleration and the link with his broader political
philosophy. This requires analysing the context of seventeenth century
Enlightenment Europe, reasons for the movement from the state of nature to civil
society, the importance of property and the importance of the social contract. Finally,
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this chapter will briefly outline the structure of government as articulated by John
Locke.
Toleration during the Enlightenment era
Prior to the concept of toleration coming into the vocabulary of many Enlightenment
thinkers, the theological-political landscape of Europe was one in which furious
struggles existed between faith, reason, coercion and conscience. Although
arguments for toleration were frequently advanced, Europe still remained a bitterly
divided and extremely intolerant society. In short, the seventeenth century did not
see the total embracing of toleration by theorists. Although it gained a strong footing
in many areas, it was by no means secure (Grell and Porter 2002:1). Locke provides
the reader in, A Letter Concerning Toleration, with the situation that existed in
England at the time.
Our government has not only been partial in matters of religion; but those also who have
suffered under that partiality, and have therefore endeavoured by their writings to
vindicate their own writings and liberties, have for the most part done it upon narrow
principles, suited only to the interests of their own sects (Locke 2006[1689], 21).
Hence, religion still played a powerful role throughout Enlightenment Europe or as
Grell and Porter argue, 'it was central to the Enlightenment project itself' (2002, 1).
Centrality of religious thinking in the Enlightenment era, for the most part, took the
form of limits, double meanings and fluctuations. These specific characteristics need
special attention and will be dealt with later on in the chapter.
The Enlightenment era was predominantly characterised by theorists who advocated
for the reformation of religion as opposed to its total abolishment. These theorists
wanted the fundamental religious ideas of prejudice and superstition to be attuned
with those of secular society such as 'reason, nature, morality and civic duties' (Grell
and Porter 2002, 6). Locke argued that one way in which this could be achieved was
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through individuals possessing independent thinking in all matters, especially that of
religion. He says:
Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people;
because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation, as blindly to leave it to
the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or
worship he shall embrace (Locke 2006[1689], 26).
Moreover, toleration also played an important part within the Christian faith. Joseph
Priestly (English Polymath) was a fierce advocate of the Enlightenment era as
superior to the ancient world, particularly with reference to religion, science and
government. He wrote that toleration would be instrumental in any future relationship
between faith and rationality and argued that this would be assured by the
separation of church and the state (Grell and Porter 2002, 2). Locke held a similar
viewpoint and argued:
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil
government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one
and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be
always arising, between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one hand, a
concernment for the interests of men's souls, and on the other hand, a care of the
commonwealth (Locke 2006[1689],26).
Taking previous conceptions of toleration into consideration, champions of
Enlightenment were to meddle with the evolving claims to toleration. Certain
theorists developed individualistic models that argued for a unique independence for
man outside that of the church and state. They actively opposed a ruler having any
legitimate control over the mind because this would go against the universal law in
the state of nature. In essence, faith was not to be forced 'because it appears not
that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel
anyone to his religion' (Locke 2006[1689], 26).
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Although thoughts on freedom and toleration were being advanced in Europe in both
the secular and religious spheres, uncertainties were also being raised concerning
the reliability of the 'truth', at the time dominated by religious thought. The invention
of printing also played a role in challenging the superiority of religious thinkers. The
sacred writings of the Bible, Quran, and Torah were frequently challenged and even
those who interpreted these sacred texts began being challenged on the legitimacy
of their right to interpretation (Grell and Porter 2002,4). The early stages of
globalisation and its movement of people to all corners of the earth alerted
Enlightenment thinkers to the vast array of people, cultures and religions that
existed. The diversity that was seen brought up the question as to who had the right
to judge and persecute on matters of right and wrong (Grell and Porter 2002,4). It
would be naive to suggest that diversity of the world's population played the most
significant role in bringing Enlightenment thinkers towards toleration, however, Locke
wrote of the dangers of not tolerating diverse religious opinions.
In the variety and contradiction of opinions and religion, wherein the princes of the world
are as much divided as their secular interests. the narrow way would be much strained;
one country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under the
obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction; and that which
heightens the absurdity and very well suits the notion of deity, men would owe their
eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity (Locke 2006[1689], 28).
Many theorists also advance the theory that the Peace of Westphalia, which ended
the Thirty Years War in 1648, convinced the ruling elite in Europe that the
dominance of religious thought cannot be allowed to continue. This dominance had
brought about tremendous bloodshed and misery for the people of Europe all in the
name of the Bible, divine right or prophetic revelation. Historical, philosophical and
moral challenges grew against theology and many even claimed that religion had not
only caused civil disorder but also mental disorder with saints and priests literally
going out of their minds (Grell and Porter 2002,4). Locke also argues that the
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toleration of different sects is enshrined in the Bible and that men should not be so
ignorant of the advantages (civil order) of it.
The seventeenth century, in particular the 1680's was also an era of tremendous
religious repressiveness. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was perhaps the
most significant repressive moment in European history. Of the approximately
900000 Protestants that existed in France prior to 1680, perhaps 700000 were
forced to convert to Catholicism and the rest were forced to go into exile. In addition
to this, numerous Muslims and Jews where forced to convert to Catholicism
(Marshall 2006, 19). Many theorists thus believed that the best solution to religious
repressiveness was toleration. This principle provides the basis for the secular
nature of most Western states. This explanation, however, requires more in-depth
analysis. The next section shall provide the reader with Locke's conception of
toleration.
Locke's conception of toleration
Toleration theorists of the Enlightenment era construed humans as beings whose
intelligence pointed them towards freedom of expression and thought. One of
Locke's less talked about works, the Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
developed a model of the human mind. One of its books dealt with religion, in
particular its epistemology. Locke rejected the idea that humans are born with an
inherent idea of God. Rather, he argued that the idea of God is a gradual process
that starts from the five senses and which slowly develops into this complex idea
(God). The very fact that he uses the idea of God in his political philosophy tells the
reader that his conception of toleration will have theological undertones. This
understanding of the human mind was further developed and entrenched in The
Reasonableness of Christianity were Locke states that matters of religious thought
must be measured against reason to determine its authenticity (Grell and Porter
2002,5-6).
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According to Locke, reason and intelligence point individuals towards the idea of
toleration. Toleration, in his view, is the answer to successful and peaceful co-
existence of religion and the state. Locke's treatise is opposed to the one defended
by Hobbes in the Leviathan in view of the fact that it supports toleration for the
diverse denominations of Christianity. Locke's thoughts on toleration were in
harmony with his epistemology thus his chief aspiration was to make a distinction
between the different responsibilities of government and religion. Locke views the
function of the government as positioned in the arena of external interests such as
liberty and the general welfare of the populace. With regards to the function of
religion, Locke wrote:
The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only
in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the
mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force
(Locke 2006[1689], 27).
In essence, religion should be a matter concerning an individual's conscience and
not that of the civil ruler. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke outlined the
powers of the civil ruler. These should be aimed at:
The impartial execution of equal laws, to secure on to all the people in general, and to
every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of these things belonging to
this life. In anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for
the preservation of these things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of
punishment, consisting in the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, or goods,
which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy (Locke 2006[1689],26).
Locke clarified in some detail, what he meant by limits on civil rulers. He separated
opinions and actions into three kinds. Firstly, civil rulers are not (my emphasis)
allowed to interfere in matters that did not concern the state, matters such as
speculative opinions and certain forms of divine devotion. Secondly, civil rulers
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should not concern themselves with those opinions (although neither good nor bad
in themselves) that did not conflict with the rights of others. Finally, Locke grouped
vices and virtues as action and opinions that were either good or bad as they are
(Grell and Porter 2002, 6). These limits were extremely important for Locke since
they provided the foundation for the most advantageous relationship between the
government and its citizens.
Under the first grouping, actions and opinions possessed 'an absolute and universal
right to toleration'. They do not affect the polity since they were either a private
matter or a matter between the person and God alone (Grell and Porter 2002,6). To
elucidate opinions under the second grouping, Locke writes:
There would remain nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less
apt to produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever (Locke
2006[1689],51).
Under the third grouping, Locke held that civil rulers should not concern themselves
with the 'salvation of their (men's) souls' (Locke 2006[1689], 28). In this form, it is
argued that Locke believed the rationale of political society to be the preservation of
peace and security, and it is God who would reward good deeds and punish vice.
With this in mind, any usage of political power that intrudes into the arena of
individual autonomy, would amount to an unlawful exercise of power (1969,32).
Locke wrote that no man ought to be forced to surrender his opinion, or even change
his opinion since he believed that such compulsion would lay the foundations for
insincerity. The only instance the magistrate could intrude upon an individual's
religious autonomy was if he (the magistrate) anticipated a threat to peace in society.
Nevertheless, public disorder may arise as a result of any religious action, and since
the sovereign is the sole judge of adversarial actions (he is only answerable to God
for his actions), 'the restrictive definition of the purpose of political society may seem
a flimsy protection' (Dunn 1969, 32).
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In providing further explanation, Locke utilises a different method of argument to
come to the same conclusion. He believes that any deviation from the stated aims of
political society possesses no legitimacy. Locke also considers this to be an
indispensable feature of an individual's rights that the state should not interfere in the
religious affairs of its citizens. The reason for this standpoint is the subjective nature
of religious conviction, which cannot be generated by the actions of the state (Dunn
1969, 34). In this regard, Locke writes that a church (religion) 'is a free and voluntary
society...no man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone
joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that
profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God' (Locke 2006[1689], 28).
Such belief can only be changed by divine intervention.
It is argued by Dunn that any forced change in the religious behaviour of the
populace that is 'unaccompanied by subjective conviction' has no basis from the
point of view of government (1969,33). To illuminate this, Locke argues that 'the
public good is the rule and measure of all law-making ... [and] no opinions contrary to
human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of
civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate' (Locke 2006[1689], 39 and 49).
Religious actions performed in this manner obliterate the intention of religious
actions. Forced religious behavioural change is viewed as unreasonable and
dangerous by the coerced since it entails relinquishing everlasting happiness for
immediate relief. In essence, it entails sacrificing religious behaviour for worldly gain.
Numerous methods are used to make this point more noticeable. Firstly, Locke's
institution of government relies mostly on the consent of the populace, provided by
them because of the inherent advantages available to them. Governments cannot
therefore claim legitimacy when its actions cause harm to its citizens. Locke also
explicitly argues that no appropriate compensation can be provided for compelled
action, especially if it turns out to be misconceived (Dunn 1969, 34). In short,
coercion has no place in Locke's theory since it de-legitimises a government and
goes against the very essence of toleration. Individuals need to be satisfied of their
own part to salvation or else they will be eternally unhappy since they have lost their
freedom to choose. Locke says:
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To impose such things therefore upon any people, contrary to their own judgement, is in
effect is to command them to offend God; which, considering that the end of all religion is
to please him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end, appears to be absurd
beyond expression (Locke 2006[1689],39).
Dunn writes that although these arguments might occasionally seem incoherent and
unclear, the main point is very effective and its 'reversal of the more rationalist
authoritarian arguments impressively deft' (1969, 34). Locke argues rather strongly
that it is impossible to come up with a set of criteria for freeing acts of individuals
from the authority of the political sphere and because of this Dunn believes, 'he
(Locke) could hardly have conducted his first defence of individual right by an explicit
advocacy of conscientious subversion' (1969,34). Hence, political authority is the
cornerstone of society and this is Locke's method of arguing that the sovereign is the
final judge on all matters.
The issue of property that was so vehemently argued in the Two Treatises by Locke
(the most detailed locus of resistance to political claims) still seems to hold huge
importance in A Letter Concerning Toleration. It is evident that only around the
circumstances of faith did Locke possess any tendency towards political legitimacy.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Locke could be inclined to do so by sympathy
(Dunn 1969, 35). Nevertheless, Dunn writes:
Even if the protection of conscience is given no political viability in a concrete historical
situation and even if no empirical feature of this world is granted an autonomous
legitimacy against the will of the sovereign, the authoritarian structure of the theory has
been critically disturbed. Moreover, the pivot on which the structure is turned is an
epistemological argument, if rather a crude one (1969, 36).
It is abundantly clear that the toleration of faith does not open up the way for
rebellious actions by religious enthusiasts. The conscience of the magistrate plays
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the most influential role between the toleration of opinions and beliefs and, the rigid
order of political control. Nevertheless, that conscience Locke is referring to is the
magistrate's, in his official capacity. Locke argues that the magistrate's position as
the highest authority in the land and the manner in which he conducts his duties in
public is what he will be held accountable to God for (Dunn 1969, 36-37). In the
event that the subjects in society disagree with, for example, a specific type of
legislation he wants to enact (which he believed to be in the best interests of
society), Locke wrote:
As the private judgement of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him
from obligation to the law, so the private judgment of the magistrate does not give him
any new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of
the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant. .. (Locke
2006[1689], 49).
In addition, Locke believed that if a government were administered justly, then the
above-mentioned problems would not occur often. He states: 'that if a government
faithfully administered, and the counsels of the magistrate be indeed directed to the
public good, this will seldom happen' (Locke 2006[1689], 48). In the rare case that
governments' actions trespass their jurisdiction, Locke writes:
But if the law indeed be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrates
authority (as for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be
compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of
another church) men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their
consciences. For political society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every
man's possession of the things in this life. The care of men's soul, and of the things in
heaven. which neither does belong to the commonwealth; nor can be subjected to it, is
entirely left to a man's self (Locke 2006[1689], 48).
To clarify the protection of religious belief and behaviour, Dunn argued that toleration
did not extend to all matters of an individual's relationship to God but rather only to
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the extent that this relationship did not infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Moreover, the logic of genuine religious thinking outlined by Locke, serves as
a safeguard against the violation of the rights of others. Nevertheless but
importantly, Dunn points out that the form in which human beings hold religious
belief are often related with an assortment of threatening activities which directly
intrudes upon the rights of others (1969,37). Again, it is up to the sovereign to be
judge of an intruding action. Locke argues that for religious behaviour to be deemed
legitimate, it needs to have been derived from God alone. The sovereign need not
tolerate another form of religious behaviour. Locke says:
Things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority, be made any part
of the worship of God ...what hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions,
built upon the magistrates authority, might not (against conscience) be imposed upon the
worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consist
in the religious use of such things that are in their own nature indifferent: nor are they
sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them (Locke
2006[1689],40).
In addition to this, although Locke believes that Godly worship is a matter of private
concern involving the individual and the God in question, he argues that to worship
your God in the way outlined by Catholics in a Protestant country is tantamount to
constructive rebellion and it is the responsibility of the sovereign to decide whether
religious activities remain a private matter (Dunn 1969, 37). The sovereign has the
immense responsibility to ensure that he restricts his intrusion, regardless of the
power of his private abhorrence, only to those times when he judges behaviour to
threaten the interests and rights of others in society. Locke is careful to state that this
responsibility must only be utilised in the most cautious and meticulous manner and
it will repeatedly be complicated to establish its particular implications in practice
(Dunn 1969, 37-38). Locke has clearly placed a huge responsibility on the sovereign.
Nevertheless, he is quick to point out that the religious behaviour of individuals be
practiced with the greatest attention to detail, as outlined by God.
27
Locke writes that every individual is indebted to worship his God in the manner he
sees fit so as to achieve eternal happiness that would otherwise be lacking. He says:
Although the magistrate's opinion in religion to be sound, and the way that he appoints be
truly evangelical, yet if I am not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will
be no safety in it for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in, against the
dictates of my conscience, will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may grow
rich by an art that I take no delight in; but I cannot be saved by a religion that I distrust,
and by worship that I abhor (Locke 2006[1689], 38).
An individual is also compelled to gauge the particular make-up of his obligation with
extreme attention to detail for the reason that he alone is entirely accountable for his
correctness or incorrectness in this evaluation (Dunn 1969, 38). Locke argues that if
an individual believes the evaluation of his religious behaviour to be theologically
accurate and his enthusiasm solely religious, they have indeed an absolute
responsibility to go against political authority. To sharpen this analysis, Locke writes
that as long as an individual's reasons are truly religious, the ruler has no right to
intervene. Individuals can use this right not to subscribe to practices they do not wish
to. Conversely, this power does not give individuals the right to question the authority
of the sovereign, only to resist political authority (Dunn 1969, 38). On the other hand,
if an individual makes a mistake in his theological apprehension or in the
righteousness of his enthusiasm, they maintain 'a prima facie obligation to do what
they see as obligatory - even if in the final judgement they are to be divinely
punished for the erroneous assessment of their duty' (Dunn 1969, 38). Locke
proclaimed:
The magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of any speculative
opinions in any church, because they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the
subject. If a Roman Catholic believes that to be really the body of Christ, which another
calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New
Testament to be the word of god, he does not thereby alter anything in men's civil rights
(Locke 2006[1689],46).
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By placing restrictions on the individual's legitimate religious belief as well as on the
sovereign's obligation to tolerate, such subjectively held religious duties are both set
by their similarity with the aims of structured human society (Dunn 1969, 39). Dunn
argues that Locke's account of these purposes in A Letter Concerning Toleration is
'more crisply reductivist than his other writings'. He wrote that government was only
necessary because of the need of human society to live in peace and harmony. For
this reason, this (the maintenance of peace) and nothing else is the principal aim (its
end) of government. The sovereign is nothing more that an official between
individuals in society and does not possess even the least right to compel or
formulate for others any type of virtue (Dunn 1969, 39). The movement of this idea
from religious studies and epistemology to sociology and politics made every human
being the ultimate adjudicator of how far the society he inhabits, has taken the step
in the direction of avoiding force, which is its main end (Dunn 1969:39).
Locke never conceived of toleration without limits and the next section will enlighten
the reader, in detail, about these limitations.
Limitations of toleration
Enlightenment thinkers usually portrayed themselves as custodians of freedom and
equality, as those who stood up against the censorship of opinions and as tutors to
rulers of the Enlightenment era. Frederick the Great (an unbeliever), for example,
argued in favour of toleration of all faiths in Prussia and even went to the extent of
encouraging the immigration of Jews. He proclaimed that 'here (Prussia) everyone
must be allowed to choose his own road to salvation' (cited in Grell and Porter 2003,
9). Nevertheless, the situation that really existed was much more complicated than
what these ideals suggest. As mentioned a little earlier, the Enlightenment era was
characterised by widespread disagreements. Questions began to be raised as to
what exactly toleration should consist of, who should benefit from it and vice versa,
should it be guaranteed by law as Locke suggested and so on.
During the context of the mid-seventeenth century (1660s in this instance), those
who advocated for religious toleration denied, in numerous instances, toleration of
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Catholics and atheists. Locke was no different and opposed the toleration of
Catholics and atheists (Marshall 2006, 680). This section shall attempt to outline to
the reader, those who were denied tolerance and the various reasons given for this
intolerance.
Locke was explicit as to who would qualify for toleration. To put this into perspective,
Locke wrote that toleration does not extend to those who suggested 'opinions
contrary to human society, or (opinions contrary) to those moral rules which are
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate'
(Locke 2006[1689], 49). Catholics were also denied toleration since Locke argued
that, 'that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is
constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso
facto, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince' (Locke
2006[1689], 50). Finally, Atheists also fell under those sects not to be tolerated since
they 'deny the being of a God' and because of this, 'promises, covenants, and oaths,
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist' (Locke
2006[1689], 51). 'Promises, covenants and oaths' as well as having loyalty only to
the civil ruler were fundamental to Locke's thesis and as a result, any opposing
beliefs would jeopardise law and order in society.
Locke provides much detail regarding the limitation clause of his conception of
toleration. Those excluded from toleration included sects who possessed traditions
of murdering children (he may be referring to the satanic churches and cults) and to
those who have no desire for moral cleanliness. The rationale behind this limitation
is that these actions and opinions are unlawful in every sphere of society. They
neither conform to the worship of God nor any religious gathering. On the same
point, because toleration is central to Locke's thesis, only churches that advocate for
toleration are approved to enter into his society (Grell and Porter 2002, 6).
Locke conceded that atheists could behave morally and ethically. Nevertheless, he
fervently argued that the only manner in which immoral and illegal activity could be
conquered was through the warning of chastisement by a divine figure (Tully 1983,
8). This clearly does not apply to atheists. Locke argues that atheists did not
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possess the eagerness to behave in a socially accepted manner and subsequently
could not be tolerated. Locke's foremost predicament regarding atheists seems to
have less to do with their involvement in society and more 'with the attitude they take
to the very foundations of the social order' (Waldron 2002, 225). With regards to
Catholics, Tully argues that although they may behave morally and ethically, their
allegiance is towards the pope over secular authority and as such, cannot be
tolerated. Locke also wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration that 'it is unreasonable
that any should have a free liberty of their religion who do not acknowledge it as a
principle of theirs that nobody ought to molest another because he dissents from him
in religion' (Locke 2006[1689], 49). Nevertheless, Locke was prepared to accept
Catholics if they dissociated their political allegiance to the pope (Tully 1983, 8). In
fact, Locke was prepared to tolerate any group as along as their allegiance was to
the sovereign.
It is abundantly clear from Locke's position on atheism that he assumes that God
consciousness provides the foundation for the social fabric of human society. By
connecting law and order in society to the fear of God, Locke is going against the
established forms of hierarchy for stability and social cohesion in his politics.
Waldron writes:
He has to make promissory undertakings, and the spirit of such undertakings amongst
otherwise free and equal individuals do an amount of work in moral and political
philosophy that his more conservative critics regard as reckless, to say the least.
Promises and contracts cannot do that work unless they are backed up with fear of God.
in whose presence the undertakings in question have been given (2002, 223-224).
It is clear from Locke's discussion on resistance and revolution in the Second
Treatise, that he is concerned about his thesis exposing the effective running of the
state to disarray and ruin 'as often as it shall please a bruise head, a turbulent spirit,
to desire the alteration of government' (Locke 1988[1688], 390). Nevertheless, he
insists that this will only happen if totalitarianism is both authentic and universal.
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Additionally, and in a similar vein to his treatment of atheists, Locke relies to a large
extent on the appeal to paradise (Waldron 2002, 226). Locke writes:
God in heaven ... alone ... is judge of the right. Force is opposed to nothing, but to unjust
and unlawful force; whoever makes an opposition in any other case, draws on himself a
just condemnation both from God and man (Locke 1988[1688], 241 and 204).
Waldron argues that atheists do not think in this important and necessary way
because they cannot take their actions seriously by thinking in this manner.
Consequently, the worry is that atheists will be more reckless and deceitful regarding
they way they conduct themselves in the social and political arena than a believer in
God (2002,226). John Dunn interprets Locke's view on atheists and writes that the
atheist is not just a hazard to society but also 'an inherent menace to every human
being' (cited in Waldron 2002, 228). Accordingly, Locke believed that human society
would be far better off without the toleration of atheists.
Locke writes in A Letter Concerning Toleration that 'the taking away of God, though
but even in thought, dissolves all (the framework of natural law equality)' (Locke
2006[1689], 51). He also says, 'as for other practical opinions... if they do not tend to
establish domination over others ... there can be no reason why they should not be
tolerated' (Locke 2006[1689], 51). This tendency 'to establish domination over
others' seems to be regarded by Locke as the foremost criterion for measuring
intolerability. Thus an atheist is in no place to preserve, educate, interpret or apply
equality (Waldron 2002, 228).
Although a great deal of A Letter Concerning Toleration concerns 'the mutual
toleration of Christians in their professions of religion' (Locke 2006[1689], 23),
Muslims, Jews and others are still somewhat mentioned and afforded toleration in
the Letter. This is rather peculiar since they acknowledge very little of the teachings
of Christianity. Waldron seems to suggest that the toleration of these religions might
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be because of their monotheism (2002, 229). Muslims could also have been
tolerated because of their acknowledgement of Jesus Christ as a prophet of God
although they do not believe in him as the Son of God. Marshall argues that a
possible reason for the toleration of Muslims and Jews in early modern Europe was
because it was believed that they could be persuaded to convert to Christianity
(2006, 371).
Waldron also examines the fundamental difficulty of defining the human species for
the function of Locke's commitment to basic equality. He further outlines new
interpretations of Locke's views on toleration, slavery, property, and the relation
involving the sexes (Waldron 2002:1). Waldron believes that the notion of human
equality is central to Lockean politics and morality and, subsequently, any person
who denies the main foundation of it, has no place in society (Waldron 2002:228).
He states that he is not sure that Locke excludes Catholics. His interpretation
focuses on the following passage: 'the magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching
or professing of any speculative opinions in any church, because they have no
relation to the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic believes that to be
really the body of Christ, which another man calls bread, he does no injury to his
neighbour' (Locke 2006[1689], 46). Nevertheless, Locke may just have been leaving
the door open for the possible toleration of Catholics in the event they give up their
allegiance to the pope.
Academics have not ceased to offer explanations for the restrictions Locke imposed
on toleration. Jonathan Scott has pointed out that the general fear of Catholics in
England in late seventeenth century was as a result of the power they held with
respect to territory in comparison to Protestants. Moreover, 'history' at the time
pointed to the fact that Catholicism in Ireland was so strong that it possessed the
potential to conquer England. Of course this was exaggerated but even Locke
exclaimed that Catholicism 'so nearly surrounds and threatens us' (cited in Marshall
2006, 28).
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Cranston (1991, 81), Schochet (1992, 52) and Murphy (2001, 225), take context and
experience into consideration by regarding events such as the civil war in England
and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes as playing a crucial role since it
established the threat that Catholics and atheists posed to law and order in society
(cited in Lorenzo 2003,243). John Rawls places a particular emphasis on context
alone by arguing that Locke might have championed full toleration had he lived in
another time. Nonetheless, Lorenzo makes the crucial point that Locke's position
was envisaged before the aforementioned occurrences. As a result he argues that
the influence of context taken cannot offer a holistic explanation of Locke's position
(Lorenzo 2003,248). It should be evident from the outset that there are multiple
explanations for Locke's conception of toleration.
Locke's dependence on conventional thinking is given particular emphasis by
Ashcraft (1986,298 and 1993,203). During the context that Locke lived, the English
held the view that Catholics are a threat to law and security since they can only be
loyal to the pope. Ashcraft argues that Locke used this type of established thinking to
locate Catholics outside the 'natural moral community' (cited in Lorenzo 2003, 249).
Additionally, Wooton (1993, 109-110) and Kraynak (1980) write that Locke's
pragmatic stance played an important role. Wooton emphasises Locke's judgement
that the ideas of Catholics and atheists were destructive and for that reason should
not to be tolerated. Kraynak points in the direction of prudence. This is because
prudential thinking allowed the magistrate not to tolerate views that might pose a
threat to national order and security (cited in Lorenzo 2003, 249). John Dunn writes
that it is apparent 'that there is some sort of harmony between the venture from the
academy of diplomacy and the world of politics and Locke's shift from the rigid and
authoritarian legalism of his earlier writings to the more dominantly prudential
emphasis of A Letter Concerning Toleration (Dunn 1969, 27).
Mendus (cited in Lorenzo 2003, 249) argues that the absence of a positive
conception of rights, allows the magistrate to selectively prohibit certain sects from
enjoying rights provided that this is tied to national order and security. On the other
hand, Lorenzo believes that since Mendus allows for a positive conception of
toleration, and that prudential thinking allows justification in terms of law and order,
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she subsequently overlooks the decisive task tradition plays in Locke's analysis
(Lorenzo 2003, 249).
Prudence, according to Garver (1987) 'is a mode of moral reasoning that falls
between the conservative orderliness of algorithmic methods and the radical
freedom of heuristics. To reason prudently means creating exceptions to general
rules, creating space for practical judgment' (cited in Lorenzo 2003, 249). Firstly, in
the context of rights, we find that prudential thinking allows the magistrate to apply
practical knowledge to create an exception to a status quo of rules governing
society. Lorenzo states that it is important to consider prudential thinking as a
cautious manner of rendering decisions. Applying it once more in the context of
rights, this perception describes the first prudential exclusion to the universal rule
granting rights as a 'rightly wary hesitation to confer those powers on some allegedly
dangerous group of people' (2003, 249). Prudential judgement clears the way for
practical judgment without rejecting a universal rule awarding rights, at the same
time as concurrently and ironically punishing those who have been traditionally
marginalised. Accordingly, Lorenzo believes that Locke's views on toleration are
best explained as a combination involving prudence and tradition (Lorenzo 2003,
249).
Locke believes toleration to be a political right. Therefore a thorough conception and
analysis of rights from Locke's perspective needs to be discussed in order to
comprehend the connection between prudence and rights. Firstly, natural law in the
state of nature allows comprehensive liberty from subjection and the exercising of all
rights. Conversely, human law authorises magistrates to implement the rights we
surrender to government. Nevertheless, the rights of the average citizen are set by
the restrictions on the powers of the magistrate that are a consequence of our terms
of consent, natural law, and the responsibilities of government (Lorenzo 2003, 254).
Lockean political rights have two vital characteristics. Firstly, they are a negative
understanding of rights in view of the fact that their essence is a result of the powers
we possess after (my emphasis) we give government its essential powers. Secondly,
in the same vain as every other right, political rights are constrained by the obligation
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to safeguard humankind that all, together with governments, hold (Lorenzo 2003,
254).
The first characteristic is prevalent all the way through the A Letter Concerning
Toleration. Locke strongly opposed totalitarian style conventional justifications for
control of divine issues, and by doing this, he provided a negative justification of
toleration (Lorenzo 2003, 254). Lorenzo argues that Locke even more emphatically
embraced the latter characteristic. In the A Letter Concerning Toleration, he granted
prudential justifications to permit the magistrate to endorse selective toleration. The
logic utilised by the magistrate to accomplish his obligation to expand toleration while
retaining national law and order is prudential as well as principled according to Locke
(2003,254). Prudential thinking is also linked with particulars, not universals:
And thus far of toleration as it concerns the magistrate's duty. Having showed what he is
in conscience bound to do, it will be not to be amiss to consider a little what he ought to
do in prudence.
But because the duties of men are contained in the general established rules but their
prudence is regulated by circumstances relating to themselves in particular, it will be
necessary in showing how much toleration is the magistrate's interest to come to
particulars (Locke 2006[1689), 36).
Locke asserted that critical analysis of the politics and morals of atheists and
Catholics would demonstrate that they posed a threat to the state law and order.
This allowed Locke to sanction the magistrate to make exceptions to the line
separating public and private life that otherwise nullifies the magistrate's claim to
power in the sphere of divine religion (Lorenzo 2003, 255). In summary, Lorenzo's
viewpoint revolves around the provision of 'positive as well as practical justifications,
particularly if we concede that prudential considerations may allow governments,
under exceptional circumstances, to limit the freedom to act on religious beliefs'
(Lorenzo 2003, 255).
Even though prudence does hold authenticity, John Dunn believes that the principal
argument is also legalistic. It is a disagreement concerning titles (Locke uses 'claim',
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'right' and even 'liberty' as synonyms throughout his work) in addition to a
deliberation about prudential action and 'the form of argument mediates skilfully
between these two disparate themes' (Dunn 1969, 31). The debate commences
from a theological explanation of the nature of government on its particular function.
Locke discusses the precise function of the state in much detail, more than in any of
his previous political writings. Indeed, he goes to the extent of designating any
attempt by the government to implement individual morality as 'injustice' (Dunn
1969, 31). It is understood that any society outside Locke's arrangement of political
authority is morally lifeless and without any right to take independent initiatives in the
political arena. Nevertheless, he later does not make this distinction so apparent, but
this does not automatically indicate that he did not persist in holding exactly the
same position (Dunn 1969, 31).
Tully writes that toleration of differing viewpoints does not have its foundation on the
belief that these are an issue of indifference, (some academics suggest that this is
the case with regards to Two Treatises or historically), however, it rest on the
opposite belief, that 'one's beliefs are true and, with one's practices, are of infinite
importance' (2006, 6-7).
Locke believes that the only method a Church can attain genuine converts is through
persuasion and not aggression. This is an important part of the Letter because it
relates to his fundamental ending, Le., that government should not engage itself with
issues that belong in the religious sphere. Locke outlines three reasons. Firstly,
individuals cannot hand control over religion to the forces of secular society.
Secondly, force cannot produce the transformation that is indispensable for salvation
since even though it can pressurise conformity, it cannot alter one's convictions.
Finally, even if force could convince somebody of a view, God does not pressurise
individuals in opposition to their will (Tully 2006, 8).
The time has now come to articulate Locke's conception of toleration within his
broader political philosophy, the most important of which is his discussion on
property.
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Toleration within Locke's political philosophy
Situating Locke's conception of toleration within his broader political philosophy
helps the reader gain a holistic understanding of his thoughts. The key to Locke's
political philosophy is the right to private property, finishing off with how an individual
relates to his creator and the rest of mankind. Nevertheless, this requires in-depth
critical analysis. Locke explains that the state of nature is the origin of mankind in
which the law of nature was the sole authority. It is in this state that man possessed
the freedom to act in the manner he saw fit, the only condition being that the
preservation of mankind and peace should be his top priority. To give pertinence to
this, Locke writes:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty and possessions
(Locke 1988[1688], 271).
The right to self preservation is considered important by Locke and it is precisely
because of this right that individuals are allowed to pursue things that result in their
survival and them achieving happiness. Locke writes that the riches of the earth
have been provided for humans by God to pursue the objectives mentioned above,
but these natural riches are only worthwhile if individuals put their labour to it. Locke
proposes that because all men own their bodies completely, any product of their
physical labour also belongs to them.
The movement to civil society is precisely because man wants to secure private
property. Locke's solution to this problem was to argue that 'every man has a
property in his own person' so that 'the labour of his body, and the work of his hands
are his'. Therefore, whatsoever 'he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with ... and thereby makes it his
property' (Locke 1988[1688], 287-288). Nevertheless, the acquisition of property was
not infinite, since it was initially restricted to the consumption of a man. Nevertheless,
this right to property later extended to the fruits of the land in addition to the land
itself. As with everything, the right to private property had its restrictions. Since God
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wants to make all of mankind happy, no individual or family may take possession of
something if he causes harm to the other person in the process. Locke also argued
that possession of property beyond what is necessary is not allowed since wastage
deprives others the opportunity of gaining benefit from it (land). He argues that the
world is full of men that go against the laws of nature on a daily basis. Civil society is
thus a place whereby a community of individuals can enact and enforce rules and
regulations to better guarantee the protection of their property and freedoms. Laslett
believes that 'the whole argument is intended to demonstrate individual property did
not arise from the common consent of all mankind, though in the end the actual
distribution of it is held to be due to money, which is a matter of consent' (1988,
101 ).
To summarise the events of the state of nature then, it can be said that the dealings
of men and most importantly their invention of money, had brought them into an
irrational and untrustworthy relationship with one another. This arose out of the
material world - from property (Laslett 1988, 102). In fact, men were led to leave the
state of nature and to set up a source of power 'for regulating and preserving of
property' (Locke, 1988[1688], 268). It becomes even more apparent as one reads
the Second Treatise that much more emphasis is laid on 'the great and chief end ...
of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting of themselves under government, is
the preservation of property. To which in the state of nature, there are many things
wanting' (Locke, 1988[1688], 351). Thus, Locke believed the law of nature was no
longer adequate for human society and needed to be combined with the formation of
government.
Laslett (1988, 102-103) argues that property seems to give the political quality to
personality. For example, property is something that a slave is incapable of attaining
because he lacks political rights. Locke also argues that the power of the despot
cannot be termed political since it can only be exercised over those who do not
possess property. It is unclear as to which definition of property Locke is using in
which context. Nevertheless, the mere fact that he allowed property of different
forms such as material property and labour/natural objects property does help us
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comprehend why the concept of an individual's abstract right as a whole enters into
his explanation of the foundation of civil society (Laslett 1988, 102-103).
Laslett goes onto argue that property (in Locke's terms) neatly encompasses all the
relevant aspects of political society such as rights and perhaps more correctly, the
place of an individual in society. Laslett writes:
It is because they can be symbolised as property, something a man can conceive of as
distinguishable from himself though a part of himself, that a man's attributes, such as his
freedom, his equality, his power to execute the law of nature, can become the subject of
his consent, the subject of any negotiation with his fellows (1988, 103).
It is unclear whether in fact Locke conceived of property in this manner. On the other
hand, it is clear that Locke believes that civil society should only concern itself with
'civil concernments' which when investigated further, seems to be identical in
meaning as outlined in the Second Treatise (Laslett 1988, 103).
Most importantly, Laslett points out that Locke's main aim in his argument of
toleration is the separation of the church and state, that the religious fraternity is
inaccessible to secular society, of property in fact. It is along these lines then that
Locke believed property to hold the key to the movement from rights and freedoms
in the religious sense (as well as natural law in the state of nature) to the world of
rights and freedoms based on and assured by political arrangements (Laslett 1988,
103).
Given the fact that toleration has now been envisaged for the different groups in
society, its limits and its position within Locke's philosophy discussed, the time has
come for the reader to briefly understand the structure of government that Locke
believed would best be suited for his theory of toleration to prosper.
Structure of Government
Locke's views on government are important for his conception of toleration since he
argued that toleration needed to be secured by political arrangements and
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government is the foundation of any political arrangement. The latter part of the
Second Treatise led to a more explicit evaluation of government were Locke
stresses majoritarian rule as the most realistic preference that governments should
pursue. He also argues that an established law that is common to all, a body that is
acknowledged and unprejudiced to provide judgement as well as the authority to
maintain such judgments, are three indispensable fundamentals of a government.
Locke argues for a structure of government with different branches such as a strong
legislature, in addition to an executive that is active and does not exceed the
lawmakers in power. He writes:
First: they are to govern by promulgated established laws... Secondly, these laws also
ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people... Thirdly,
they must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the
people ... Fourthly, the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws
to anybody else (Locke 1988[1688), 363).
Furthermore:
It is necessary there should be a power always in being which should see to the
execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and
executive powers come often to be separated (Locke 1988[1688), 365).
The legislature is supreme and holds this position since it represents the combined
power of the commonwealth, and the commonwealth, aspiring to maintain one body,
can only have one supreme power. Subsequently, the executive power is inferior
and is differentiated from the legislative in that it cannot enact laws and by and large
is merely a delegated power. The legislative should preferably be a body that is
representative, and should not be in continuous existence (Laslett 1988, 119). This
does not exclude, according to Laslett, the prospect that both the executive and
legislative powers being exercised by the same body or individual. Laslett further
suggests that Locke had in mind a system whereby the executive plays a role in the
legislative. England is given as an example to illustrate this (1988, 119).
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Laslett points out that there is 'no theory of importance and desirability of the
perpetual residence of these powers in separate hands in order to preserve liberty,
guarantee rights or keep the constitution in harmony' (Laslett 1988, 120). This
viewpoint is confirmed by taking the following into consideration. At the outset, the
judiciary, whose autonomy is indispensable to constitutional government, is never
spoken off alongside the other three features. The judiciary is not a separate power,
it is a characteristic of the state and consequently it is not sensible to put it in
conjunction with the executive and legislative (Laslett 1988, 120). Locke also writes
about the correct execution and just exercise of these powers. Nevertheless, this
does not come in the form of a policy of necessary separation. The notion of trust is
of utmost importance to its successful execution, which applies to the legislative in
its fullest force, as well as to the executive and federative (Laslett 1988, 120).
Locke finally comes to the subject of formulating a new government towards the end
of the Second Treatise. He writes that as soon as governments cease to act in the
interests of the people, it dissolves, otherwise is overthrown and may possibly be
replaced. In the instance the government is dissolved, the populace is liberated to
transform the legislative. They must also produce a new civil state that acts in
accordance with their best interests. Locke insists that this arrangement protects
against instability and revolt since it makes an allowance for the populace to
transform their legislative as well as their laws without resorting to the use of force.
Toleration also provides the best possible environment for government to function
effectively. This means that every inhabitant enjoys the same privileges as the
others. In this respect, Locke summarises his views on toleration and how it relates
to the aims of his political philosophy at the end of the A Letter Concerning
Toleration by writing: 'the sum of all we drive at is, that every man may enjoy the
same rights that are granted to others' (Locke 2006[1689], 53). Nevertheless, it is
also important to take note of the limitations imposed by Locke with regards to




In summary, toleration is the answer proposed by John Locke as the solution to the
predicament involving the relationship between religion and the state. Toleration is
the best possible arrangement according to Locke, since it provides for the
simultaneous but separate existence of both religion and the secular state. Both
religion and the secular state were to have their separate spheres of influence with
religion occupying the private sphere and secularity the public sphere, with the
sovereign being the final judge on all matters. Toleration was to be afforded to all
groups in society as long as they did not pose a threat to peace in society.
Nevertheless, Locke's conception of toleration was not all encompassing and did
allow toleration for Catholics, atheists and satanic groups. In short, toleration was
prohibited to groups that posed a threat to peace. It is abundantly clear that Locke's
exclusion of the aforementioned groups in society is not practical for us in the
contemporary era. However, the mere fact that this is impractical for us does not
mean that we shouldn't utilise Locke's rationale for arriving at his positions. Rejection
of the solutions provided by Locke is not a point at which we should reason. This is
because a controversy continues to rage in liberal philosophy concerning the
foundations of equality and human rights as well as about the extent these can be
maintained without belief in religion (Waldron 2002, 235). Although Locke's rationale
for excluding the aforementioned groups from the public realm is not practical in the
modern era, it is still applicable to our philosophical endeavour of trying to arrive at a
broad foundation and justification for equality (Waldron 2002,235).
Some academics analyse the issue of equality with explicit religious lenses, and
Waldron's approach to equality as a political ideal places huge emphasis on the
Christian faith. Nevertheless, although Locke uses a theological idea of equality in
his conception of toleration to underpin the idea of separating church and state, we
should not be swayed too much by Waldron's analysis. Waldron seems to be an
apologist for Locke who also happens to be religious himself and who would like to
identify in the 'father' of liberalism an argument that suggests that we can't do
without religion if we are to defend equality and human rights. This is incorrect both
in its own terms and in terms of the fact that it assumes that we are all agreed about
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the worth of equality and human rights. Moreover, as stated at the beginning of the
chapter, Locke outlined the different functions of government and religion,
(separating church and state) and toleration is the manner in which he hoped they
would co-exist in peace and harmony. Finally, toleration plays a critical role with
reference to the structure of government, since it allows for the best possible
environment for government to prosper.
Locke's theological conception of toleration came under severe attack from many
Enlightenment thinkers precisely because of its religious undertones. Many thinkers
such as Benedict de Spinoza argued against Locke and conceived of their own
understanding of toleration. The next chapter shall deal with Spinoza's alternative




The Enlightenment battle for toleration between Spinoza and Locke
The seventeenth and eighteenth century was an era of unprecedented philosophical
debate and the concept of toleration played a significant role in this debate. Although
the main premise of the thesis is that the relationship between religion and the state
in the contemporary era is primarily based on the toleration thoughts of John Locke,
Locke's thoughts were severely criticised and contested during the Enlightenment
era. One of Locke's foremost opponents was Benedict de Spinoza, who possessed
a radically different conception of toleration to his. This has become known as the
Enlightenment battle for toleration between Locke and Spinoza. Jonathan Israel
outlines two principal traditions of toleration during the Enlightenment era in Europe:
the Arminian, which culminates in Locke, and the Republican, which culminates in
Spinoza (2000, 102). Although some theorists have attempted to link Locke and
Spinoza, this could not be further from the truth. A huge philosophical and
ideological space separates the two, which will be thoroughly investigated in this
chapter. Having spent so much time outlining Locke's version of toleration (Le. his
understanding on the relationship between religion and the state) in the opening
chapter, this chapter will be dedicated for the most part to Spinoza's conception of
toleration (and his conception of the relationship between religion and the state), the
differences between the two traditions as well as the possible reasons for the
eventual triumph of Locke's ideas on toleration.
The question of Spinoza is fundamental and obligatory to any appropriate
consideration of early Enlightenment European thought. Its standing in the
intellectual debate of Europe in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century is
frequently underestimated. Commencing from the mid-sixteenth century forwards,
civilisation in Europe was one in which formal education, public debate, preaching
and even tavern disputes on the subject of religion and the world, were intimately
supervised and inhibited. Practically nowhere was complete toleration advocated for
and barely any person subscribed to the idea of freedom of thought and belief of the
individual. Spinoza belonged to the radical branch of Enlightenment thought. Israel
writes:
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Although it cannot be said that its political thought was one of its most prominent or
developed features, undeniably the Radical Enlightenment was undoubtedly republican,
did reject divine-right monarchy, and did evince anti-aristocratic and democratic
tendencies. Democratic republicanism was a particularly marked feature of English,
Dutch and Italian radicals though it is also encountered, albeit much more faintly, in
French and German contexts (2001, 21).
As a result of the power struggle between theological and philosophical elements,
virtually every church itself became acrimoniously separated over philosophical and
scientific debates in addition to internal theological disagreement. Philosophy had
the purpose of complicating and intensifying conflicts involving contending
theological factions (Israel 2001, 12-19).
Before we embark on the aforementioned tasks, the context in which Spinoza lived
needs attention. Having been expelled from the Portuguese Jewish community in
Amsterdam at the age of 23, he chose to live out the remaining years of his life not
affiliated to any religious sects although he still maintained close friendships with
many members of the Protestant sect, something that was particularly rare during
the Enlightenment era. Although he tried distancing himself from the philosophers of
his time, many theorists still associate him with Hobbes and Machiavelli (as well as
stoicism) amongst a host of others (Mason 1994, 443). Being part of the radical
branch of the Enlightenment, he provided a reasoned case for freedom of belief. He
argued in the Theological-Political Treatise that the onus should be on individuals to
decide on what to believe in, though he did not leave much room for its free practice.
The principal purpose of his Theological-Political Treatise was to argue that freedom
of judgment might exist for individuals devoid of being a threat to peace and piety of
society (Mason 1994, 443). In summary, there are three important contexts we need
to consider: Spinoza's early intellectual development, his independence from fellow
philosophers and his views of religious freedom.
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To recap, the Locke's ideas on toleration argued that each person should be
individually responsible for the salvation of his soul and openly perform the form of
worship from which he seeks salvation. By dramatic contrast, Spinoza's conception
of toleration places freedom of thought and speech on the highest rung of the ladder
and the salvation of souls holds no place in his theory. Hence, Locke's theory is
chiefly theological and Spinoza's, secular (Israel 2002, 103).
As was discussed in the first chapter, the nature of Locke's theory excludes certain
sects from toleration, although it will be worth repeating here. In the first instance,
Locke's toleration ideas do not extend to thoughts and opinions that would pose
harm to peace and order in society. Secondly, Locke did not allow for the toleration
of Catholics since they only held allegiance to the Pope and not to the civil
magistrate as required by Locke. Finally, Locke did not approve of the toleration of
atheists for the reason that they reject the existence of God. Since they reject the
existence of God, covenants and oaths would have no bearing of them and thus
society would be in chaos if toleration were extended to them.
Freedom of worship in Spinoza's sense is a secondary issue. In fact, the
Theological-Political Treatise does not discuss the issue at all, even though it quite
explicitly sets out his views on religion. It is only in his final and unfinished work,
Political Treatise, did he briefly outline his views on the issue in the context of an
aristocratic dispensation (Israel 2002, 104). Spinoza's meaning and subsequent
views on freedom are an integral step in investigating his views on toleration
Freedom according to Spinoza
Before embarking on Spinoza's conception of toleration, it is important to provide an
understanding of Spinoza's meaning of freedom. In Ethics 1, he provides an abstract
definition of the concept:
That thing is said to be free. which exists by the mere necessity of its own nature, and is
determined in its actions by itself alone. That thing is said to be necessary, or rather
compelled, when it is determined in its existence by something else in a certain fixed ratio
(Spinoza 1955[1677), 45).
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Pitts (1986,22) argues that this is a unique definition when compared to other
theorists such as Mill and Hobbes who employed a negative conception of freedom.
In order to best understand Spinoza's conception of freedom, we need to analyse his
theory of self-preservation (in the state of nature), something he gave tremendous
importance to. Spinoza believes that every individual possesses the sovereign right
to pursue his own interest, albeit in accordance with the laws of nature:
Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway of nature) thinks
useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions, that he has
a sovereign right to seek and to take for himself as he best can, whether by force,
cunning, entreaty, or any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone
who hinders the accomplishment of this purpose (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 201-202).
From this it is evident that freedom and self-interest go hand-in-hand. True freedom
is the pursuit of self-interest. Spinoza argues that freedom cannot be defined in
terms of our reactions to external forces. He devotes Ethics IV to arguing that
emotions can be a serious impediment to freedom. Pitts argues that 'if we see
pleasure and pain as mysterious external forces beyond our control, then our
emotions will lead us away from freedom' (1986, 23). Spinoza writes in Ethics V,
Prop 6: 'the mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto,
insofar as we come to understand all things necessary' (Spinoza 1955[1677], 250).
According to Pitts, this means that as individuals comprehend and take control over
the real causes of their emotions, they reduce the influence their emotions exert on
them by exerting the power of their intelligence (1986:23). Locke's theory of the right
to self-preservation revolves around it precisely being the right that allows individuals
to pursue things that result in their survival and happiness.
For Spinoza. an individual who possesses wisdom can be said to be freer than
someone who doesn't, since he breaks the bonds which enslave him. Conversely,
the ordinary man believes that the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are
the sole ends of his actions, and he defines self-preservation in this regard. Hence,
he enslaves himself to those forces outside himself, which he thinks causes these
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emotions (Pitts 1986, 23). To summarise, freedom according to Spinoza is spoken
of in terms of self-interest while taking into consideration that our actions are always
inhibited by the laws of nature. Freedom also depends on not being held hostage by
external forces such as emotion and reason plays a central role in our lives by
assisting us in reducing the effects of external forces, thus increasing our freedom
(Pitts 1986, 23).
Locke's understanding of freedom differs from Spinoza in that it is centred on the
issue of equality. Locke writes in the Two Treatises: 'the lord and master of them all'
did not 'by any manifest declaration of his will set one above another, and confer on
him by an evident and clear appointment and undoubted right to domination and
sovereignty' (Locke 1988[1688], 269). Moreover, we all have the same faculties and
the same natural advantages such as power and jurisdiction. Freedom then,
according to Locke, has no absolute meaning and is defined in terms of laws: 'where
there is no law, there is no freedom' (Locke 1988[1688], 206). Laslett argues that
natural law is used by Locke to set the boundaries to natural freedom and because
natural law is considered the will of God, the omnipotence of God can be reconciled
with freedom of humans (1988, 94).
Although Locke's understanding of reason will be discussed later, we need to
analyse it in relation to his understanding of freedom. Reason, according to Locke
has consequences for natural liberty and equality. Reason in the Lockean sense is
looked at as the law of nature. In other words, it governs the actions of humans. It
plays the part of an individual's conscience and governs the relationship between
individuals in society for the reason that it is given by God to arbitrate between
humankind (Laslett 1988, 95). It provides justification to the secondary arrangement
of children in relation to their parents, who (children) although are born without full
equality are born in equality. Children attain freedom when they reach the age of
reason, although this does not mean that underage children do not possess will. It
merely outlines that parents use their reason to will for their children since reason is
superior over parent and child. Nonetheless, Locke does admit that although age,
intelligence etc is not important to his larger purpose, it can violate natural equality.
The consequences of disobeying reason can be far-reaching. When an individual
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seeks to subordinate another (denying that the person is free to the same extent that
he is), he in effect refuses to acknowledge the superiority of reason (Laslett 1988,
95). The consequences of this Locke says, are that the individual 'renders himself
liable to be destroyed by the injured person and the rest of mankind, that will join
with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or noxious brute with
whom mankind can have neither society or security' (Locke 1988 [1688], 383).
Locke's analysis of freedom in relation to reason is not accidental but imperative for
the maintenance of freedom and justice. He says that reason is 'the common bond
whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society' (Locke 1988 [1688].
383). Laslett argues that the discussion of freedom in relation to reason may be
construed as his concluding analysis on the critique of Hobbes' absolutist civil
philosophy. Hobbes in the Leviathan, proposed to subordinate all human wills to one
will and law and government fell under the same jurisdiction. Hence, individuals were
treated as beasts and any person who doubted the superiority of the sovereign (its
rights and powers) would be treated as a beast (1983,96). Laslett seems to believe
that Locke possessed a personal rather than political agenda. He argues that a
closer analysis of Locke's argument will reveal that Locke was attacking Charles and
James Stuart who he believed fitted the criteria of those 'wild savage beasts with
whom men can have no society or security' since they attempted to govern England
as despots, if not in the sense envisaged by Hobbes then unquestionably in the
patriarchal sense (Laslett 1988, 96). The different conceptions of freedom by Locke
and Spinoza are important as it provides the insight needed to analyse their different
conceptions of toleration.
Spinoza's political ideas
Spinoza's understanding of individual freedom has been discussed and we now
need to investigate how this translates into the political sphere, i.e. an individual's
political freedom. In the opening chapter of the Political Treatise, Spinoza hints as to
the foundations of his political ideas (the state of nature):
Lastly, inasmuch as all men, whether barbarous or civilised. everywhere frame customs,
and forms some kind of civil state. we must not, therefore, look to proofs of reason for the
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causes and natural bases of dominion, but derive them from the general nature or
position of mankind (Spinoza 1951 [1670],290).
Spinoza concedes that the state of nature has numerous faults (conflicting desires).
As a result, men come together in civil society. By entering into civil society, an
individual agrees to forego the right to act as he desires to the sovereign. This is a
social contract between the individual at the centre and the sovereign at the helm.
Nevertheless, this does not give the sovereign unlimited authority to extend to all
aspects of people's lives. Spinoza says: 'no one can ever so utterly transfer to
another his power and, consequently, his rights, as to cease being a man; nor can
there ever be a power so sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish'
(Spinoza 1951[1670], 214). Locke's understanding of the state of nature is that it is
the starting point of mankind in which natural law was the exclusive power. The state
of nature allowed individuals the freedom to proceed as they wish, the solitary
stipulation being the protection and peaceful co-existence of humankind. Locke
says:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty and possessions.
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order and about his
business, they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his,
not one another's pleasure (Locke 1988[1688], 271).
Spinoza states that an important limit on the sovereign's power is that he cannot
command over the thoughts of others. Hence, political freedom and individual
freedom are mutually inclusive. Pitts (1986,25) argues that reason promotes political
freedom since it allows for the long-term interest of every citizen. The sovereign
should not impede on an individual's freedom if it does not threaten the state.
As a consequence of the transference of the right to act on desire by all individuals,
the sovereign only has the power to impose his will, if he can enforce it. If he loses
this power he also loses the right to the command over the body politic. Spinoza
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argues that this will be very rare since sovereigns always consult the public good
and act according to reason. Israel argues that the transference of the right to act on
desire does not translate into an individual surrendering his right to reason or judge
for himself. Given this, he argues that Spinoza grants everyone in the body politic
the freedom to speak and freely express him or herself without endangering the
state (2002, 107).
Spinoza's reason for the formation of civil society is the imperfection of the state of
nature that results in the conflicting desires of its inhabitants. On the other hand, the
movement to civil society from Locke's perspective is precisely because man wants
to secure private property. Locke's solution to this problem was to argue that man
has property in himself thus the labour he undertakes with his body and his hands
are his. For that reason, whatsoever an individual takes out from the state that
nature has given him and mixed his labour with that becomes his property.
Toleration and religious thought according to Spinoza
Spinoza's conception of freedom and subsequently his political ideas provide the
platform from which he articulates his conception on toleration. Spinoza argued that
the most peaceful relationship between religion and the state is best achieved
through toleration. Toleration, according to Spinoza, is always the concern of the
individual and not large religious structures. Although writing in his Political Treatise
that individuals should possess the freedom of religious belief, he outlaws large
gatherings (he believed them to endanger peace and security in society) unless they
profess a state religion. Even with this, he argued in favour of toleration and freedom
of religion. Don Garret says Spinoza 'denied supernatural revelation, and criticised
popular religion as a grave danger to the peace and stability of the state; yet he
devoted himself to the careful interpretation of scripture, and argued for complete
toleration of religion' (1996, 1).
Spinoza's understanding of a state religion is an idealised religion centred on
philosophical principles in which Christianity has no place and the 'worship of God
consists in the practice and obedience to him solely in justice and charity, or love
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towards one's neighbour' (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 187). In Theological-Political
Treatise, he outlines seven basic tenets of his state religion:
That God or a supreme being exists, ... That he is one, That he is omnipresent, ...
That he has supreme right and dominion over all things, that the worship of God
consists only in justice and charity, or love towards one's neighbour, '" That all those,
and those only, who obey God by their manner of life are saved, ... [and] Lastly, that God
forgives the sins of those who repent. .. (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 186-187).
The biggest difference between the Republican and Arminian traditions lies in the
subordination of freedom of worship and conscience in Spinoza's thinking and a
huge emphasis on preventing powerful churches from forming and prospering.
Locke's version toleration on the other hand, places importance on the state moving
away from the religious sphere at the moment freedom and independence of the
numerous religious structures are acknowledged. In terms of religious belief,
Spinoza holds that those who hold different religious opinions should not be
persecuted since this goes against the very tenets of faith: justice and charity. He
provides a definition of faith:
Faith consists of knowledge of God, without which obedience would be impossible, and
which the mere fact of obedience to him implies. This definition is so clear and follows so
plainly from what we have already proved that it needs no explanation (Spinoza 1951
[1670],184).
Spinoza sets out to show in chapter fourteen of Theological-Political Treatise, that
there is no link between faith and philosophy. He argues that the foundations and
aims of both are poles apart from each other since they both possess vastly different
foundations and aims. He sees faith to be in the arena of piety and obedience, and
philosophy, truth. Spinoza argues:
Philosophy is based on axioms which must be sought from nature alone: faith is based
on history and language, and must be sought for only in scripture and revelation ...Faith
therefore, allows the greatest latitude in philosophical speculation, allowing us without
blame to think what we like about anything, and only condemning, as heretics and
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schismatics, those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred, strife ...
(Spinoza 1951 [1670], 189).
Nevertheless, Spinoza points out that neither reason is subservient to theology or
theology to reason. In response to those who believed that faith should be adapted
to philosophy, Spinoza argued that this would entail ascribing to prophets, words and
meanings that they could never had said or meant. Mason (1994,456) argues the
reason for the separation of faith and philosophy is because Spinoza did not set out
to prove the tenets of faith. Mason also writes that choice, according to Spinoza, is a
false impression and we cannot choose what to believe or not to believe. If an
individual knows something to be true, then he has an obligation to believe it. It is
believed that the real force of the Theological-Political Treatise is derived from the
'the effects of discovered truth on religion in a systematic way. This is not truth
produced by reason or faith but rather by research, discovery and argument' (Mason
1994, 457). This was done by careful interpretation, research and argument of
sacred texts. Spinoza considers faithful individuals to be those that allow people
(using their own intellect) to follow justice and charity.
The connection involving reason and virtue was emphasised by Spinoza and he
argued the more reason advances, the more stability in politics and less conflict
there is and for this reason the further the state promotes everyone's interest, which
is his fundamental rationalisation for the state and its purposes. In addition to this, he
is firm that a free man is one who lives according to the dictates of reason alone. He
also argues that every individual should have the right to be in opposition to laws
and that a free and rational individual can have a say in the altering of the form of
government and, in all probability should, in instances of persistent unsteadiness,
oppression and authoritarianism (Israel 2001, 260-262).
According to Locke, the capacity to reason comes from God with the aim to assist us
in search of the truth. In keeping with his theological conception of toleration, he
states that as creations of God, we realise that we have the right to self-preservation.
Humans have the natural inclination to hate being miserable and the desire to be
happy and thus we keep away from things that may result in unhappiness and pain.
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Instead, we search for pleasure. Moreover, as equals in the eyes of God (through
reason of course), Locke believes that God must want all his subjects to attain
happiness. In the event one individual causes the next to be miserable, that
individual has abandoned the will of God. With this in mind, every individual should
preserve others in addition to himself since this will result in toleration. Locke
believes that reason is the best way to arrive at the truth since this will result in no
person being naturally better than the next in discovering the truth. Locke says, 'the
law of nature... is the law of reason' (Locke 1988[1688],287-288). Laslett writes that
it is our reason that tells us to utilise natural law and thus it is reason that makes us
free (1988,95). Locke also says: 'we are born free as we are born rational; not that
we have exercise of either: age that brings one, brings with it the other too' (Locke
1988[1688], 308). In speaking about governments, Locke insists that individuals
must not follow it without caution since the state might sacrifice reason in the
process. This would be in violation of the law of nature.
The threat of factionalism is something Spinoza argues should be avoided since
patricians could join rival priesthoods and doctrines. Dissention is bound to cause
damage to the state by giving churchmen more access and subsequently more
influence into the workings of the state (Israel 2002, 106). Israel writes:
Spinoza's toleration theory implies and in places expressly asserts the use of law, and of
political power, to weaken, or remove, the force of theological concepts from broad areas
of social, cultural and economic life. Obviously, under this schema, toleration is extended
when ecclesiastical leverage over education is reduced, and diminished when it is
allowed to expand (2002, 106).
The taking of oaths in a court of law is one area that Spinoza wants a complete end
to. On the other hand, it is for this specific reason that Locke excludes atheists from
toleration as discussed earlier, since he believes 'promises, covenants, and oaths,
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist' (Locke
2006[1689], 51). On the other hand, Spinoza believes that this would weaken the
state, which is supreme. The best commonwealth, according to Spinoza, is one that
'allows freedom of philosophical speculation no less that of religious belief (Spinoza
55
1951 [1670], 261). His chief purpose is to deny the validity of faith and religious
doctrines. He believes that faith is only good for instilling good conduct and
obedience. Spinoza writes:
I will remark that Moses did not seek to convince the Jews by reason, but bound them by
a covenant, by oaths, and by conferring benefits; further, he threatened the people with
punishment if they infringed the law, and promised rewards if they should obey it. All
these are not means for teaching knowledge, but for inspiring obedience. The doctrine of
Gospel enjoins nothing but simple faith, namely, to believe in God and to honour him,
which is the same thing as to obey him (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 183).
He goes on to say: 'in fact, I will go further, and maintain that every man is bound to
adapt these dogmas of faith to his own way of thinking, and interpret them according
as he feels that he can give them his fullest and most unhesitating assent, so that he
may obey God with his whole heart' (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 188). Therefore, freedom
of thought is the key to Spinoza's conception of toleration.
Israel (2002, 108-109) argues that the reason Spinoza stresses individual autonomy
in terms of thought as opposed to the conscience and worship of Locke is to provide
the space for a broader theory of toleration. He also argues that even the broadest
understanding of freedom of conscience excludes access to a variety of arguments
and in particular, philosophical arguments. Spinoza says that the 'less freedom of
judgement is conceded to men, the further their distance from the most natural state,
and consequently the more oppressive the regime' (Israel 2001, 109). What this
implies, according to Israel, is that the unlimited access to ideas is a method by
which freedom of conscience and thought can be measured (2001, 109).
Another aspect of toleration that Spinoza championed was freedom of expression.
Taking personal and political freedom into consideration (as discussed earlier), it is
clear that Spinoza does not believe in censorship. In other words, freedom of
expression cannot be curtailed, apart right from exceptional circumstances. 'No one
can willingly transfer his natural of free reason and judgement about everything, nor
can he be compelled to do so'(Spinoza 1951 [1670], 257). This is also an area that
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governments cannot legislate since this is the principal cause of divisions and sects
in society. In citing the example of Amsterdam, he argues that toleration of
conflicting beliefs and not legislation would be the best method because it poses no
harm to the state (Pitts 1986, 29). Moreover, In Theological-Political Treatise he
writes:
However unlimited, therefore, the power of the sovereign may be, however implicitly it is
trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men from forming
judgements according to their own intellect, or being influenced by any given emotion. It
is true that it has the right to treat as enemies all men whose opinion do not, on all
subjects, entirely coincide with its own, but we are not discussing its strict rights, but its
proper course of action (Spinoza 1951[1670], 258).
This is in strong contrast to Hobbes who advocated for an absolutist government
since he believed that humans were evil by nature and thus gave the sovereign
complete ideological control. Nonetheless, Hobbes is not our concern here. The
central limit of political power, according to Spinoza is that the sovereign should not
command the thoughts of others since:
Obedience is less a matter of the outward act than of the mind's inner activity, so that the
man who wholeheartedly decides to obey the commands of another is most completely
under his government and in consequence he who rules in the hearts of his subjects has
the most adequate sovereignty (Spinoza 1951[1670], 258).
Spinoza believes that censorship will have disastrous consequences. Honest men
will be sent into exile because they possess beliefs not in accordance with the
sovereign. Hence he believes that censorship will harm the state. It is clear that
honesty is held in higher esteem than pleasing others and freedom of judgement is
not an impediment to living in peace and harmony in society. Pitts (1986,26) says
freedom of thought and freedom of expression need to be taken together since
Spinoza uses freedom of thought with the idea of reasonable government to build his
defence of freedom of expression.
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Earlier, we spoke about the sovereign restricting freedom of expression in
exceptional circumstances. With this in mind, the main aim of the state is freedom
and when this is threatened, the sovereign can curtail freedom of expression.
Spinoza seems particularly concerned that speech should not be used to curtail the
freedom of others or harm others (Pitts 1986, 27). Nevertheless, Spinoza's defence
of toleration does not depend on possible harms or benefits but on his version of
natural rights. Thus, freedom of expression should be an integral aspect of the social
contract and any attempt at censorship (besides the one outlined above) will cause
tremendous harm to the state (Pitts 1986, 27). Spinoza also claims that censorship
will only 'succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom and
raise feelings of piety and revenge rather than of terror'. In addition to this,
'uprightness and good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are thus
encouraged, and sectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have been made to
their animosity, and they have gained the states sanction for the doctrines of which
they are interpreters' (Spinoza 1951[1670], 265).
The sovereign's right to rule also extends into the area of spiritual matters. Spinoza
believes that all religious practices should result in peace and harmony in society.
Spinoza says:
Moreover, the rites of religion and the outward observances of piety should be in
accordance with public peace and well-being and, should therefore be determined by the
sovereign power alone. I speak here only of the outward observances of piety and the
external rites of religion, not of piety itself, nor of the inward worship of God, nor the
means by which the mind is inwardly led to do homage to God in singleness of heart
(Spinoza 1951[1670], 245).
This is similar to the position adopted by Hobbes. Given this, Spinoza believes that
secular rulers should be the proper interpreters of divine scriptures because they
possess reason and experience. He also argues that no individual can rightly obey
God, if his piety does not conform to the public good. The welfare of society is the
law of the sovereign and all must conform to this. According to Locke, the sovereign
is secular in nature and its only function is to promote peace and security in society.
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Salvation of souls is the responsibility of the religious sphere. Moreover, the
sovereign can only intervene in the religious sphere to resolve a matter that poses a
threat to the public good.
Pitts argues that Spinoza's analysis of expression is 'psychologically insightful'.
He (Spinoza) points out that our opinions of the actions and beliefs of others are actually
more descriptive of our own prejudices. Violence and social conflict are, on his analysis,
mere projections into the world or our own misunderstandings of the sources of our
emotions. It is this sort of misunderstanding of the causes of the pleasures and pain that
leads us to want to suppress the actions and beliefs of others (1986,28).
The false aim of those who censor information is safety. Those that believe the
elimination of some beliefs from the public sphere will make their beliefs superior
and more widely available are fools, according to Spinoza. This is because our
thoughts and beliefs are not as a result of actions or statements of other individuals
but rather as a consequence of our human intuition to comprehend. Hence it is an
internal act of reason. In addition to this, Spinoza argues that it is one thing to curtail
the understanding of an individual, but another to think that you can fundamentally
change the long-standing convictions of others by subjectively imposing legislation
(pilts 1986, 28).
Although Locke holds the right to reason and subsequently the right to freedom of
expression in high regard, his theory on toleration is more theologically inclined as its
main focus is the freedom of conscience and worship. This could be one of the
reasons why his conception of toleration was given more importance than that of
Spinoza. Given the political, philosophical and religious climate of his time, most
people were not ready to embrace the radical secular theory of toleration outlined by
Spinoza.
Spinoza's major exception in his account of toleration is that of sedition. He defines
sedition as beliefs 'which, when accepted, immediately destroy the covenant
whereby everyone surrendered the right to act as he pleased' (Spinoza 1951 [1670],
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233). When entering into the social contract (also by agreeing to citizenship),
individuals agree not to oppose the laws of the sovereign. This limitation is
important, according to Spinoza, if there is to be any state at all. This is similar to
Locke who allows the sovereign to intervene if religious ideas cause danger to the
public good. Nonetheless, Locke's intervention has a theological ring to it whilst
Spinoza's is mainly secular.
Freedom to publish views
In chapter nineteen of Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza's toleration ideas
ventures in the direction of freedom to publish views. This was unique in the sense
that no other theorist (including Locke, Bayle or the Arminian tradition in general) of
the time championed this aspect of toleration, especially not Locke. Spinoza argued
that freedom to publish views must be upheld, no matter to what extent they may be
disliked. Israel believes that his advocacy for press freedom might be connected to
his own difficulty to get his works published in Holland. Spinoza's friend Adriaen
Koerbagh was convicted and incarcerated for publishing what was deemed to be
blasphemous material, which perhaps also influenced his decision to champion this
aspect of freedom. Spinoza believed that the restriction of freedom of expression
and the freedom of the press endangers freedom and the state (Israel 2002, 109).
His views on the freedom to publish views and opinions can be summarised by the
following quotation:
From all the considerations it is clearer than the sun at noonday, that the true
schismatic's are those who condemn other men's writings rather than those authors
themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal solely to reason. In fact,
the real disturbers of the peace are those who, in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of
judgement which they are unable to tyrannise over (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 264).
Any attempt to curtail the freedom of the press is tantamount to authoritarianism
according to Spinoza. Spinoza's radical conception of toleration should be quite
evident by now and this should confirm how drastically it deviates from the
understanding of Locke and the Arminians. The principal aim of the right to freedom
of thought and speech, according to Israel was to 'argue against, and eventually
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overthrow, the prevailing structures of theological and political authority' (2002, 110).
In the more radical sections of Spinoza's work, this thought stretched to
overthrowing structures of authority based on the theologies of revealed religion.
Some theorists argued that Spinoza held negative views regarding revolution or
didn't regard them as effective in bringing about political change. Nevertheless, what
Spinoza really opposed was revolution based on passions, prejudices and violence.
The mere fact that Spinoza allows the freedom of the press is because he firmly
believed that the ideas published in such books could bring about a revolution that
'ameliorates the human condition' (Israel 2001, 110).
On the other hand, Locke conceived of toleration in a limited sense and
subsequently had to defend this from critics such as Jonas Proast who argued that
this would result in the formation of fringe sects in society. However, it would have
been impossible for Locke to incorporate those who rejected divine revelation and
providence. These men campaigned for unlimited freedom of the press, an unlimited
freedom of expression and free trade in literature (Israel 2002, 111). Locke was
insistent that these unlimited freedoms would pose a threat to peace and security in
society and thus could not be incorporated into his conception of toleration.
Spinoza argues that the minds of individuals cannot be controlled in the same way
as their speech. If this were the case, every ruler would sit safely in office knowing
that his subjects will act according to his dictates. He writes:
If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king would sit safely on
his throne, and government by compulsion would cease; for every subject would shape
his life according to the intentions of the rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false,
good or evil, just or unjust, in obedience to their dictates (Spinoza 1951 [1670],257).
Power of this kind, according to Spinoza, is more attuned to a monarchy and not a
democracy, a form of government he advocates for. He says that if governments
attempt to control the minds of citizens it becomes 'tyrannical, and it is considered an
abuse of sovereignty and usurpation of the rights of subjects'. Government will also
be considered tyrannical if it 'seeks to prescribe what shall be excepted as true, or
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rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God'
(1951 [1670], 257). He is quick to point out that it is impossible to control the minds
of individuals no matter how unlimited a sovereign's power may be. Spinoza believes
that disastrous results will follow if individuals are forced to give up the right to
freedom of thought, speech or publish views. For example, Spinoza writes that:
What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived than that of honourable men should
be sent like criminals into exile, because they hold diverse opinions which they cannot
disguise? What can I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed no
crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be treated as enemies
and put to death, and that the scaffold, the evil-doers, should become the arena where
the highest example of tolerance and virtue are displayed (Spinoza 1950 [1670], 263).
The principle purpose of government according to Spinoza, is to allow individuals to
develop themselves in security, and 'to employ reason unshackled; neither showing
hatred, anger or deceit, nor watched with eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact the
true aim of government is liberty'. He nonetheless questions the extent to which
freedom should be granted to individuals since 'unlimited concession would be
entirely baneful' (Spinoza 1951 [1670], 258-259).
These questions led Spinoza to question the perfect environment for his political
philosophy to flourish and he found this in democracy. The manner in which Spinoza
conceived of the relationship between his political philosophy and democracy shall
be discussed under the next section.
Democracy
Spinoza was a clear advocate of a constitutional democratic form of government
over a monarchy or aristocracy because he believed that a democracy provides the
most favourable conditions in which an individual's judgement is free and
autonomous, the worship of God unhindered and freedom granted without prejudice
(Elwes 1951,6). In short, democracy is the optimum form of government in which
religion and the state can peacefully co-exist. To further elucidate this, Spinoza
believes that in a democracy, individuals hand over their freedom to act as they
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please to the sovereign but not their freedom to reason and judge. He believes that
in a democratic dispensation, irrational actions on the part of the sovereign do not
need to be feared since the majority of individuals would not agree to these kinds of
actions. Moreover, the very aim and foundation of a democracy prevents this from
occurring since it brings individuals to act according to reason and nothing else. He
argues that a state is the freest if its laws are founded on reason and its inhabitants
live according to reason. As mentioned earlier, Spinoza believed that the best
government would allow both philosophical freedoms as well as religious freedom.
According to Israel, Spinoza says a monarchy can only be unwavering and
advantageous if the monarch's authority is deeply constrained and the supreme law
is the common good and that of every ruler (2001,271). Nonetheless, Spinoza
believes that this sort of monarchical arrangement is highly unlikely to occur.
Spinoza uses the example of Amsterdam to demonstrate a democracy working for
everyone irrespective of religious beliefs, sects or status in terms of wealth.
The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own prosperity and in the
admiration of all people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of
every nation and religion live together in the greatest harmony...His religion and sect is
considered of no importance: for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a
cause, and there is no sect so despised that his followers, provided that they harm no
one, pay every man his due, and, live uprightly, are deprived of the protection of the
magisterial authority (Spinoza 1951 [1670],264).
In Political Treatise, Spinoza argues that every citizen should be allowed to vote and
be a part of public office. 'Wherein all, without exception, who owe allegiance to the
laws of the country only and further independent and of respectable life, have the
right of voting in the supreme council and of filling offices of the dominion' (Spinoza
1951 [1670], 386). Spinoza's political theory of Democratic Republicanism makes a
provision for checks and balances, which can be identified with that of a democracy
in the contemporary era. He states that members of the council should be elected for
a period of no longer than five years so as to encourage political involvement and
offer citizens the possibility of entering the council (Israel 2001, 264). Spinoza's
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conception of democracy is, however, incomplete. He passed away (in his 40's)
whilst writing Political Treatise and missed out on the opportunity to respond to his
critics.
Locke also preferred a democracy to other forms of government, although he went
into much more detail about the make-up of this government. He argues that an
established law that is common to all, a body that is acknowledged and unprejudiced
to provide judgement as well as the authority to maintain such judgments, are three
indispensable fundamentals of a government. Locke argues for a governmental
structure with dissimilar branches such as a strong legislature, in addition to an
executive that is active and does not exceed the lawmakers in power.
The fundamental reason, according to Israel, for Locke's conception of toleration
gaining much wider acceptance was because 'the vast majority of eighteenth-
century writers were utterly unwilling to countenance a toleration of ideas which
deviated from the core tenets of revealed religion' (2002, 102). Hence, it was the
context in which Spinoza wrote that forced his conception of toleration to be
subordinated and not his ideas per se. In fact, many of his ideas on freedom of
speech and press can be found in numerous constitutions around the world. On the
other hand, Locke understanding of toleration did not deviate significantly from the
core tenets of Christianity, thus fitting in perfectly with the context of seventeenth
century Enlightenment Europe. His theological views on toleration can be said to
provide the basis for the state in the contemporary era. This involved finding a way in
which the state and religion could peacefully co-exist.
Conclusion
This chapter focused on the intellectual development of Spinoza's thought starting
with his conception of freedom, then his political ideas and finally how they come
together in his conception of toleration. Toleration, albeit in the radical sense of the
term, was Spinoza's answer to the question on the relationship between religion and
the state. These were also contrasted with Locke's conception of freedom, his
political ideas and his theory of toleration. It is clear that Spinoza and Locke were the
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two most influential toleration theorists of the Enlightenment era. Locke, coming from
the Arminian tradition, focused on the freedom of belief and worship as the basis for
his conception of toleration with the main aim of securing property. Spinoza,
belonging to the republican tradition, concentrated on freedom of thought and
speech. Freedom of worship played an insignificant role according to Spinoza. In
short, Locke possessed a theological conception of toleration whilst Spinoza's was
chiefly secular.
Toleration in the contemporary era is much more widely accepted and practiced than
during the Enlightenment era. Nevertheless, we should not take Locke's views out of
context since he could have not envisaged a conception of toleration as we have
done. The main aim of the past two chapters was to show the different ways in which
Locke and Spinoza conceived of the relationship between religion and the state,
albeit using the same theoretical concept. I have also aimed to demonstrate the
foundation of the peaceful (by and large) co-existence of religion and secularity
began with Locke's conception of toleration for reasons discussed above. This was
done through the careful contextual analysis of Locke and Spinoza's thought.
The next chapter shall engage with the civil religion thoughts of Jean Jacques
Rousseau. Rousseau's conception of the relationship between religion and the state
will be important to analyse in the hope of arriving at a holistic understanding of the
topic. Rousseau's conception also provided an important alternative to that of Locke
and Spinoza's conception, thus it plays an influential role in the intellectual history of
the separation of church and state.
65
CHAPTER THREE
Rousseau on civil religion
The eighteenth century was a pivotal moment in the intellectual history of the
Western secular state and Jean Jacques Rousseau is probably the most influential
theorist of this era. This era saw tremendous debates concerning the optimal
relationship between religion and the state (or in fact whether they could peacefully
co-exist at all). John Locke and Benedict de Spinoza articulated their conception of
the relationship between and the state in the previous century through toleration,
albeit through different understandings of the concept. The civil religion ideas
envisaged by Rousseau provided an alternative model of thinking about the
relationship between the state and religion. Rousseau's theory of the state upholding
a simple universal civil religion, distinct from Christianity, was an important step in
the direction of secularisation.
The form of secularisation advocated by Rousseau will thus be an important theory
to analyse in the hope of arriving at the broader question of the dissertation. The first
section will briefly lay down the thinking behind Rousseau's articulation of his civil
religion thoughts. The second section will link his civil religion thoughts to his broader
political philosophy and the final section will conclude on the topic of Rousseau's
conception of civil religion. Therefore, analysis of the concepts of government and
sovereign, particular and general wills is required because it is the key to
Rousseau's theory. The notion of the general will is Rousseau's term for the exercise
of popular sovereignty. Many of the works leading up to the Social Contract and the
First and Second Discourses, the Geneva Manuscript, State of War and A Letter to
Mirabeau, also need to be investigated in order to properly trace the development of
Rousseau's thought. Numerous related elements of his thought require analysis
since they lead up to his discussion of civil religion.
Civil Religion
Rousseau's discussion on civil religion is found in the penultimate chapter of the
Social Contract and his principal aim here is to demonstrate that established religion
(e.g. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) and politics cannot co-exist. Before getting
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into the crux of the argument, Rousseau provides a background to the type of
society that existed prior to established religion gaining prominence. He states that
societies were usually characterised by paganism, theocracies, polytheism and
intolerance. This is the point at which Rousseau enters the debate. He writes that
'God was placed at the head of every political society, it followed that there were as
many Gods as there were peoples' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 142). Divisions within
nations and societies seem to be the foundation of intolerance according to
Rousseau. Wars and battles would arise since armies could not obey the same
master or chief. Rousseau says: 'two armies engaged in battle with one another
could not obey the same chief. Thus from national divisions resulted polytheism, and
from it theological and civil intolerance' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 142-143).
Foreseeing that his critics might attack him on the fact that pagan societies were not
characterised by religious wars, Rousseau provides a reason for this being the case.
He argues that in pagan societies, the laws and Gods were the same thing. In
essence, a 'political war was also theological'. The various territories that the Gods
ruled over were clearly demarcated hence the Gods of one nation could not infringe
on the jurisdiction of another. Rousseau provides an example of the Gods of the
Canaanites and that of Moses and the Hebrew people to illustrate his point. He
writes:
They (Moses and the Hebrew people) did, it is true, regard as naught the Gods of the
Canaanites, proscribed peoples, doomed to destruction, and whose stronghold they were
to occupy. But note how they spoke of the divinities of the peoples they were forbidden to
attack! The possession of what belongs to Chamos your God, Jephthah said to the
Ammonites, is it not legitimacy your due? By the same title we possess the lands our
victorious Gods has acquired. That, it seems to me, indicates a well-recognised parity
between the rights of Chamos and those of the God of Israel (Rousseau 1997[1762],
143).
Nevertheless, when the Jews refused to recognise the authority of the Kings of
Babylon and later Syria over their own Gods, this resulted in their subsequent
persecution at the hands of these rulers. After this, the religion of every state was
always only attached to the laws that governed it. Rousseau believes that at the time
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of the Roman expansion, paganism became the same religion around the world. It is
in this context that Jesus and the teachings of monotheistic Christianity emerged
separating theology from its political system. This subsequently resulted in deep
divisions that Rousseau argues will always cause trouble amongst Christians. The
idea of the Spiritual Kingdom of God on earth did not go down well with pagans who
argued that Christians 'were only looking for the opportunity to become independent
and the masters, and craftily to usurp the authority which they pretended to respect
as long as they were weak' (Rousseau 1997[1762J, 144). This gradual evolution of
political society from polytheism to the monotheistic teachings of Christianity was
intended to provide a background to why Rousseau formulated his ideas on civil
religion.
Rousseau rejected both polytheistic and monotheistic forms of religion because he
feels they are politically flawed. Although conceding that the Enlightenment era was
taking society in the direction of secularisation, Rousseau mourned this fact and
argued that political society needed some sort of religion (Cristi 1997, 25). He says
that society needs a religion 'which makes him (the individual) love his duties', but
that the articles of an individual's faith 'should only concern the state and its citizens'.
He also argues that 'no state has been founded without a religious basis'. These
dogmas require its foundations to be moral in nature and 'the duties which anyone
who professes it is bound to fulfil it towards others' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 150). In
other words, this is a religion of civil principles and the sovereign is in charge of
enacting them.
Rousseau bases his solution on two important assumptions: firstly as mentioned
above, the fact that the religious foundations of the state are indispensable and
secondly 'that the Christian law is at bottom more harmful to a strong constitution of
the state' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 146).
Marcela Cristi argues that the contemporary understanding of civil religion has been
misunderstood because of Emile Durkheim's position. She argues that we need to
return to Rousseau's conception in order to attain a balanced conceptualisation of
civil religion (1997, IV). The context in which Rousseau derived the concept of civil
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religion needs consideration. Cristi situates it within Rousseau's interest in
legitimacy. She says 'indeed, his overall concern in the Social Contract, and other
political writings, is to provide practical principals by which to evaluate legitimate
social order' (1997,21). It seems his notion of civil religion is a proposed solution to
these problems. In order to see this, it is important, first, to layout his broader
political philosophy
Rousseau's political philosophy
In order to achieve a holistic understanding of Rousseau's civil religion thoughts, we
need to properly trace the development of Rousseau's thought. In chapter six of the
Social Contract as well as in the Geneva Manuscript (an earlier version of the Social
Contract), Rousseau outlines his idea of the state of nature and the movement to
civil society. He talks about the inherent shortcomings in the state of nature that
interfere with an individual's self-preservation. As a result, individuals yearn to hold
on to this right by governing it through convention (civil society).
Barnard talks about the different dangers that characterise the state of nature and
civil society. In the state of nature, things threaten individuals whilst in civil society
they are threatened by each other and it is this latter relationship that moral
problems originate. Therefore it is of utmost importance that there is equal
dependence between individuals in civil society to ensure that one does not become
a victim of oppression by another by virtue of over dependence. Only when there is
equal dependence can men restore the balance involving will and power and in the
process return to man's original sense of freedom (Barnard 1984, 246).
Since individuals hope to hold on to the right to self-preservation they had in the
state of nature, Rousseau says that the purpose of the Social Contract is to:
Inquire whether in the civil order there can be some legitimate and sure rule of
administration, taking men as they are and the laws as they can be: in this inquiry I shall
try always to combine what right permits with what interests prescribes, so that justice
and peace and utility may not be disjoined (Rousseau 1997[1762]. 41).
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Rousseau's concern with legitimacy is given pertinence in the opening paragraph of
the Social Contract when he writes: 'Man is born free and everywhere he is in
chains' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 41). The chains referred to are the constraints
placed on the freedom of inhabitants. The intention of the book, according to
Rousseau, is to debate whether in civil society there can be a legitimate form of
government, taking into consideration the instinctive nature of human beings, and
utilising laws in the best way possible. Rousseau's understanding of a legitimate
political order is:
A form of political association that will defend and protect the person and goods of each
associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all,
nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental
problem to which the social contract provides the solution (Rousseau 1997[1762],49-50).
Rousseau outlines the clauses of the Social Contract and argues that:
These clauses, rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation
of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community: For, in the first place,
since each gives himself entirely, the condition is equal to all, and since the condition is
equal for all, no one has any interest in making it burdensome to the rest (Rousseau
1997[1762],50).
Rousseau writes that the society that forms as a result of the movement towards civil
society should be called a body politic. He subsequently outlines the various
terminologies relevant to the social contract such as the state, sovereign, power,
citizens and subjects. Rousseau writes that the republic is called a state by its
members when it is passive, when it is active it is called a sovereign and the term
power is utilised when making a comparison to other similar entities. Moreover, as a
collective, associates refer to themselves as people and individually as citizens.
Finally, they are subjects when referring to themselves in relation to the state.
70
Gourevitch argues that the most recognisable feature of the Social Contract is the
moral and psychological change that human beings undergo (1997, xVii). Individuals
have to make the change from natural men towards being citizens since natural men
possess selfish needs whilst citizens realise that they are part of a community.
Citizenship transforms individuals from independent to inter-dependent beings and it
is of paramount importance that any institution in civil society understands this.
Rousseau believes it to be fatal if human beings remain self-serving and
independent beings (Barnard 1984, 245). Individuals also undergo a second
transformation. Masters argues that the basic assumption of the Social Contract is
'that man renounces his freedom without renouncing his nature as a man' (Masters
1968,314). Given this, it seems rather peculiar that Rousseau says 'these clauses,
rightly understood, all come down to just one, namely the total alienation of each
associate with all of his rights to the whole community' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 50).
Rousseau also says that no individual should retain any right:
For if individuals were left some rights, then, since there would be no common superior
who might adjudicate between them and the public, each, being judge of his own case on
some issue, would soon claim to be so on all, the state of nature would subsist and the
association necessarily become tyrannical or empty (Rousseau 1997[1762], 50).
Masters argues that Rousseau takes this view since he believes that civil society
must terminate the individual's right to be the only judge of his self-preservation.
Although some theorists have argued that Rousseau advocated for totalitarianism,
Masters believes this shouldn't be exaggerated. The total surrender of rights 'does
not involve the surrender of a pre-existing standard of justices by which civil society
could be judged. Quite the contrary, all true rights including natural rights are based
on the sacred rights of conventional society' (Masters 1968, 316). Rousseau argues
that the principles outlined in book one of the Social Contract allows the general will
to direct the state towards the common good. The agreement of this end made the
formation of civil society necessary.
In order to attain this end, equality is necessary and it is the manner in which political
freedom can be attained. The desire to achieve a society that guaranteed and
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protected liberty of the individual forms the foundation of his civil religion thoughts.
This society needed to find ways that would make obedience to government
legitimate. Rousseau believed that it was the duty of government to encourage
liberty and equality. The revolutionary thinkers in France made the acquisition of this
a fundamental concern and they have also become central to our thought in the
contemporary era (Harrison 1993, 51-52). In the Social Contract, Rousseau
identifies the two concepts mentioned above:
If we inquire into what precisely consists the greatest good of all consists in, which ought
to be the end of every system of legislation, we shall find it comes down to these two
principal objects, freedom and equality. Freedom, because any individual dependence is
that much force has been taken away from the state; equality, because freedom cannot
subsists without it (Rousseau 1997[1762], 68).
He argues that the Social Contract is a sacred right that did not come about in the
state of nature but rather by conventions. The only natural form of authority,
according to Rousseau, is the family unit with the father at the head and the children
as his subjects. Nonetheless, once the children attain the age of reason, they
become their own judge and the natural bond with their father dissolves. Grotius and
Hobbes placed emphasis on the fact that the association involving the ruler and
subject is comparable to that involving a father and his child, since they assume that
the ruler cares for his subjects and by way of this, has unrestricted rights over them.
Rousseau argues that this assumes that rulers have a natural authority over their
subjects. On the contrary, he believes that such supremacy (that advocated for by
Hobbes and Grotius) is because of force, not because of nature and thus has no
foundation in nature. Rousseau believes the right of the stronger proposition is
illegitimate since 'force does not make right and that one is only obliged to obey
legitimate powers' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 44).
Arguing that force does not give individuals the power to rule and that all human
beings are born free, Rousseau says that conventions are the only legitimate basis
for political societies. He vehemently disagrees with Grotius that an individual 'can
alienate his freedom, and enslave himself to a master' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 44).
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This arrangement, according to him, makes individuals sell themselves to the
despot, which is illegitimate. Rousseau's experience of monarchical rule has showed
him that a king usually utilises his subjects for 'his own suitable greed' (Rousseau
1997[1762],44). Individuals are born free and as a result, freedom belongs to them.
Rousseau says:
Hence, for an arbitrary government to be legitimate, the people, in each generation, have
to be master of accepting or rejecting it, but in that case the government will no longer be
arbitrary (Rousseau 1997[1762], 45).
Rousseau believes freedom to be the cornerstone of humanity and any renunciation
of it would amount to depriving an individual's action of morality. He again brings up
Grotius who argues in favour of slavery after warfare. Grotius believes that the
victors possess the right to murder the losers. Nevertheless, the vanquished can buy
his life at the expense of his freedom. A convention thus arises between the
vanquished and victor which Grotius believes to be legitimate. Rousseau disagrees
with this conception of freedom and argues that war does not have its foundations
on individual relations but on state relations. In this case, individuals are not enemies
as men, but as soldiers of the state they represent. Rousseau writes in the State of
War, that wars can never occur between private persons but only between public
persons. Here, Rousseau is referring to the sovereign whose existence arises from
the social contract and 'whose wills bears the names laws' (Rousseau 1997[1782],
175). In the Social Contract he writes that during war, they remain enemies, but as
soon as they relinquish their weapons, they should not be killed since they no longer
are soldiers. Rousseau uses this understanding to rebuff the right of the stronger
thesis arguing that if victors are not authorised to kill the vanquished, then they does
not possess the right to enslave them. Hence, the victor cannot exchange the life of
the vanquished for his freedom. To summarise his view on slavery and subsequently
on rights and freedom, Rousseau says:
Thus, from whatever angle one looks at things, the right to slavery is null, not only
because it is illegitimate, but because it is meaningless and absurd. These words slavery
and right are contradictory; they are mutually exclusive. Either between one man and
73
another, or between man and people, the following speech will be equally absurd. I make
a convention with you which is entirely at your expense and entirely at my profit, which I
shall observe as long as I please, and which you shall observe as long as I please
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 48).
To promote liberty is not sufficient enough for Rousseau, he considers the
preservation of it equally important. Rousseau's resolution is that 'each, while uniting
himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before'
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 51). In The State of War, Rousseau disagrees with Hobbes
that human beings are inherently evil and that a totalitarian state is needed to deal
with this. Hobbes argued that a state of war is a natural inclination of man. Rousseau
believes that even if human beings were evil and greedy, it will not result in a state of
war of one against each other. He says man 'is born of peace, or at least of the
precautions men have taken to secure a lasting peace' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 163).
Rousseau considers humans to be natural peace loving beings whose first reaction
is to be free when in danger. It is only once man has entered into society that he
becomes violent and warlike. To summarise his views on this, Rousseau says 'there
is, then, no general war between man and man, and the human species was not
formed solely to destroy itself' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 166). Rousseau's arguments
thus look at freedom in the positive sense (as opposed to Locke and Hobbes) since
someone is only free if he is capable of doing certain things (Harrison 1993, 53).
The idea of liberty propagated by Rousseau seems to contradict the very essence of
the word. Understanding of this very uncharacteristic idea of liberty necessitates the
understanding of the following remark made in book one chapter eight of the Social
Contract: 'for impulsion of mere appetite is slavery' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 54).
Harrison (1993,53) argues that from this, we can determine that it is not simply good
enough to want to be free. You must also desire the correct things since freedom
consist of the implementation of one's will in the acceptable manner.
The principle that guides the sovereign towards appropriate action is the general will.
The general will refers to the united will of the citizens and 'is always upright and
always tends to the public utility' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 59). He also distinguishes
74
between the 'will of all' and the general will. The former is the sum of particular wills
and the latter looks at common interests. He argues that 'adequately informed
people' will result in a good general will. But the instance factions arise, the general
will errs since some factions may dominate others. Rousseau's solution to the
problem of factionalism (and thus for the general will to be expressed perfectly)
requires 'that there be no partial society in the state, and every citizen state only his
own opinion' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 60). Issues of hierarchy and influence on duty
also need brief consideration. An individual belongs to a number of different
associations in civil society. For example, a man may be a soldier; however his duty
as a citizen precedes his function as a soldier. Similarly his duty as a human being
precedes his duty as a citizen. Importantly, in changing notions of morality, the
particular will must meet the general will at every stage. This was one of the major
challenges facing Rousseau's work.
Masters believes the concept of the general will is introduced to 'elucidate the
necessary and inevitable tension' between the sovereign and the citizen. In other
words, the tension between the sovereign and the particular will (1968, 323). This
tension not only exists, but also inherent in society. He also argues that the general
will releases 'the Hobbessian procedure of constructing the logic of the political from
Hobbes' unscientific assumptions about human nature' (Masters 1968, 324). The
tension involving the private interest of the individual and the general will not only
exists, but also is an intrinsic part of society.
Although the end of political society is spoken about with reference to the general
will, Masters writes that it is 'a formal requirement which must be fulfilled by the laws
which constitute any legitimate regime' (1968,328). In the same way as the
particular interest tending to the benefit of the individual, the general will tends to the
benefit of society. If this is the case, Rousseau says 'any true act of the general will
obligates or favours equally all citizens' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 63).
The pronouncement of the general will occurs through laws. Rousseau argues that
'conventions and laws are therefore necessary to combine rights with duties and to
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bring justice back to its object' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 66). He defines a law as
follows:
But when the whole people enacts statutes for the whole people it considers only itself,
and if a relation is then formed, it is between the entire object from one point of view and
the entire object from another point of view, with no division as a whole. Then the matter
with regard to which the statute is being enacted is general, as is the enacting will. It is
this act I call law (Rousseau 1997[1762], 67).
Laws that govern the relationship between the sovereign and the state are political
laws. Rousseau argues the relations amongst citizens should be small in
comparison to their relationship with the sovereign but large when compared to their
relationship with the state. He writes that the latter relationship gives rise to civil
laws. The relationship between individuals and the law also allows for 'establishing
criminal laws' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 81). The constitution is the fourth law (but
most important law) which 'when the other laws age or die out, revives or replaces
them' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 81).
Laws are always general and do not allow for favouritism. Any special privileges are
granted in commune. Laws are always granted in commune, and are equal since
they tend towards the general will. As a consequence, no one can feel aggrieved
(taking his private interest into consideration) that he is being disadvantaged.
According to Rousseau, because of this arrangement people are free as they were
in the state of nature (Masters 1968, 329). A republic, according to Rousseau, is
any state governed according to laws. He believes that subjects should be the
authors of the law. Rousseau's critics have nevertheless pointed out the apparent
contradiction between his phrase that states individuals will be 'forced to be free' and
the rest of his political philosophy. To gain an appropriate understanding, we need to
place this in the context in which it was written. He says:
Hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tactically includes the
following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to
obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means
nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by
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giving each citizen to the fatherland, guarantees him against all personal dependence;
the condition which is the device and makes for the operation of the political machine,
and alone renders legitimate civil engagements which would otherwise be absurd,
tyrannical, and liable to the most enormous abuses (Rousseau 1997[1762], 53).
Masters argues that laws are 'intended to introduce a certain element of rationality
into the wills of citizens'. Moreover, 'in this sense, the general will may be termed
'the law of reason' because it is the only logical basis on which reasoning men can
adopt mutually binding duties' (Masters 1968, 332).
Rousseau argues that the general will is 'always right and tends towards the public
good' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 59), though this is a very confusing understanding and
requires clarity. Rousseau conceded that the body politic does not always have to be
equal and just. Given this, Rousseau's critics have questioned how one can
ascertain whether the sovereign's actions are in tune with the general will (Masters
1968,325). To elucidate this, Rousseau argues that the general will is predominant
when opinions are close to unanimity but the particular will usually results when
there are long debates and discussions. The Social Contract according to Rousseau
is the only law that requires unanimous consent from the people. He brings up the
important point of those individuals who do not vote in favour of certain laws.
Rousseau argues that when the people's assembly is debating certain laws,
everyone voices their opinion on it and casts their ballot either accepting or rejecting
the law. The majority of votes in favour of or opposing the law is the general will. The
opinion that prevails only proves whether an individual has made an error or not in
what he took the general will to be. The question now arises as to how the general
will should be determined. Rousseau believes a hierarchy of importance should be
used in issues of the law. Serious and important matters should have a unanimous
general will. In the instance of business matters, the difference of opinion should be
narrow and be concluded as soon as a simple majority is reached. However,
Rousseau says: 'be that as it may, it is the combination of these two maxims that the
best ratios for deciding a majority are determined' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 125).
77
Subsequent to the discussion of laws, Rousseau deals with the idea of what is a
good state with reference to the size of the state. He argues that the best state is a
small one since it can be stronger than a large one.
With regard to the best constitution of a state, there are bounds to the size it can have in
order not to be either too large to be well governed, or too small to be self-sustaining. In
every body politic there is a maximum of force which it cannot succeed, and from which it
often strays by dint of growing too large. The more the social bond stretches, the looser it
grows, and in general a small state is proportionately stronger than a large one
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 73-74).
He provides numerous examples to substantiate his desirability for a small state
focusing mainly on the fact that he believes administrative tasks to be much easier to
solve. He believes that government of large states will find it difficult to enforce laws,
and people might also not possess loyalty to a leader it never sees. He argues that
'the same laws cannot suit a variety of different provinces with different morals, living
in widely different climates unable to tolerate the same form of government'
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 74). His desire for a small state arises from his belief that a
constitution is the cornerstone of a good state and should be the first thing to strive
for. Good governance is more advantageous than resources of a large territory. The
optimum size of a state, according to Rousseau, should be measured against the
size of the territory and the number of citizens. There should be enough land to
support the citizens and as many citizens as the territory can feed.
Rousseau points out the type of person's that should be legislators. These people
should not possess:
Deep rooted customs nor deep-rooted superstitions; [and] one which is not in fear of
being overrun by a sudden invasion; which without taking part in its neighbours quarrels
can resist each one of them by itself, or enlist the help of one to repulse the other; one
whose every member can be known to all, and where one is not forced to charge a man
with a greater burden than a man can bear; one which can do without all other peoples
and without which every other people can do (Rousseau 1997[1762], 77).
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He provides the example of the small state of Corsica as a well-constituted state.
People are able to 'recover and defend their freedom' and the educated are able to
teach freedom in order to ensure it can be sustained.
Rousseau believes that every piece of legislation should be based on freedom and
equality. Much has been spoken about civil freedom already. Equality, on the other
hand, refers to the relationship between power and wealth. Power should 'stop short
of all violence and never be exercised except by virtue of rank and the laws and...no
citizen be so very rich that he can buy another and none so poor that he is
compelled to sell himself (Rousseau 1997[1762], 78). Although admitting that this is
usually difficult to find in practice, Rousseau considers this as precisely the reason it
should be legislated. Furthermore, he believes that legislations should be adapted to
the specifications of each country such as 'relations that arise as much from local
conditions as from the character of the inhabitants' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 79).
Masters (1968:339) argues that the Social Contract is often misunderstood in the
contemporary era because commentators have changed the meaning of key terms
used by Rousseau. The contemporary understanding of the term legislation refers to
laws enacted by elected representatives of the people. On the other hand,
Rousseau's understanding of the term refers to basic laws, which are essential for
political order. Rousseau argued that the sovereign cannot be represented and
some have taken this to mean that his principles advocated for direct democracy.
Although he did propose representative institutions in the government of Poland, his
discussion on representation in the Social Contract must be placed in the context of
the distinction between the sovereign and government (Masters 1968:339).
Rousseau writes that 'the deputies of the people therefore are not and cannot be
representatives, they are merely agents, they cannot conclude anything definitely'
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 114).
Gourevitch argues that although the citizenry may favour the general will, they may
not know how to achieve it (1997, xxi). The ideal, which Rousseau envisaged, was
popular sovereignty. This was a far cry from the government of monarchy that
Rousseau believed should be terminated. He argued that the power of government
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should be derived from the consent of the people. This ideal of an equal society in
which every individual enjoys the same duties and privileges was something that all
theorists aspired to achieve. Moreover, Rousseau's ideal envisaged justice and hope
for all. This was the basis from which Rousseau started his idea of society. His ideas
deviate from his predecessors such as Locke in the sense that he did not give the
entire control of government to the populace (Lincoln 1897, 57). The doctrine of
popular sovereignty requires wisdom and Rousseau is aware of the immense
difficulty in merging the two concepts. Rousseau nevertheless explores a variety of
ways to merge them such as through patriotism, citizenship, civil religion, lawgiver,
elective aristocracy and different methods of elections (Gourevitch 1997, xxi).
Citizenship, patriotism and civil religion
For civil religion to become the mode of life, Rousseau believed that it needed to be
reinforced in some way. Citizenship and patriotism are the reinforcing elements that
will assist inhabitants in making the duty to their fatherland their primary business.
According to Gourevitch, citizenship 'in a well-constituted, legitimate political society,
which is self-contained, self-sufficient and patriotic, provides the best or most
satisfactory collective solution for men as they are' (1997, xxviii). Nevertheless,
Rousseau does not acknowledge that this is the only solution by noticeably outlining
the rivalry involving natural and political right i.e. involving humanity and
cosmopolitan on one side and between citizenship and patriotism on the other.
Rousseau writes:
Patriotism and humanity... are incompatible virtues in their very thrust, especially in an
entire people. The Lawgiver who strives for them both will achieve neither: such a
combination has never been seen; it will never be seen, because it is against nature, and
it is impossible to assign two objects to one and the same passion (Rousseau
1997[1672],34).
As mentioned earlier, in the movement from the state of nature to civil society,
individuals cease being men but rather become citizens. Gourevitch argues that the
citizen realises that he is no more an independent individual but a member of the
political society at large, and the 'religion he is thought is the civil religion' (1997,
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xxx). This tension between man and citizen is the central organising principal of
Rousseau's work. In Political Economy, Rousseau talks about the difference
between a model citizen and a model philosopher (man), more precisely, between
Cato and Socrates.
Let us dare to contrast Socrates himself with Cato: the one was more a philosopher, the
other more a citizen. Athens was already lost, and Socrates had no other fatherland than
the whole world: Cato carried his fatherland with his heart; he lived for it alone, and could
not outlive it. Socrates virtue is that of being the wisest of men: but compared to Caesar
and Pompey, Cato seems like a God amongst mortals (Rousseau 1997[1782], 16).
Barnard provides an appropriate understanding of the difference between patriotism
and citizenship. He writes:
A citizen, unlike a patriot, may entertain whatever private thoughts and beliefs he
happens to hold; what vitally determines the quality of citizenship, or what indeed
characterises the will of the citizen, is his readiness to match public utterances with public
deeds. Without such coherence or consistency, Rousseau emphatically maintains, there
can be no social order, for it would lack trust to sustain it (1984:253).
The above quotation points out the superiority of citizenship over patriotism and
subsequently the important role citizenship plays in the achievement of order in
society. Social order is important for civil religion, thus citizenship performs this
function effectively because it is based on discursive reasoning. Rousseau
discusses the possibility of citizenship and patriotism coinciding in relation to Poland.
He believes that the possibility of this occurring in Poland is very small unless the
Poles come up with a group of independent states. Barnard writes:
A simultaneous consciousness of patriotism and citizenship is evidently more likely within
the more confined space of a canton than within a more extended state since in the latter
points of contact are few and far between. In a greatly extended state, let alone in a state
that includes all humanity, our sentiments are bound to evaporate and grow feeble (1984,
250).
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Although patriotism and citizenship are two distinct terms, Rousseau views
patriotism as a reinforcing element of citizenship and both as important for his civil
religion. Rousseau argues that patriotism 'produces so many immortal actions, the
glory of which dazzles our feeble eyes'. Moreover, he describes patriotism as, the
virtue 'most efficacious' of all political virtues and with the ability of conjuring up the
'greatest miracles' that mankind will undertake (cited in Barnard 1984,250).
Patriotism is a powerful force in politics since it is similar to loving a mistress.
Patriotism requires no justification based on reason in a similar way that loving a
mistress cannot be argued to be reasonable. Both are spontaneous actions and
require no discursive reasoning. Although a person may love his country as a patriot,
he is devoid of a purpose. On the other hand,
Citizenship is the work of rational will, in which instrumental reasoning on one sort or
another plays a decisive role. The purpose of what we say or do lies beyond the action
itself. It is the instrumental reasoning that mediates agreement, the source and
justification, indeed the authorisation of human association within a state (Barnard
1984:251).
It is also through people agreeing rationally with one another that individuals in
society become a people. Without such an agreement there cannot be a sense of
national unity and hence no general will to characterise unity. Nonetheless, it is
important that individuals have the same aims and goals to work towards since
people do not agree for the sake of agreeing (Barnard 1984, 251). It is once citizens
have common objects that they are interdependent beings as opposed to working
with one another as if they are still independent beings (amour de soi - self
preservation). To elucidate this, citizenship makes inhabitants think that their
continued existence lies in them working together as opposed to, for themselves
(amour propre). Amour propre is a heightened consciousness of, and regard for, an
individual in relation to others around him. Whereas the savage individual only thinks
of himself, men in Rousseau's civil religion also need to be concerned of what others
think of him. Agreement comes about only when individuals become aware of what
objectives unite them. This is the foundation of citizenship. Particular wills will not
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necessarily result in a natural move towards the general will. Therefore, it becomes
the task of the legislator to make individuals realise that it is better for them to co-
operate with one another, to change inhabitants from individuals into interdependent
beings (Barnard 1984, 252). It is important to note that although patriotism may
make citizenship stronger, it does not constitute it. Patriotism is the unreasoned love
for one's fatherland whilst citizenship is rational agreement on the common objective
and the will to stick to that agreement. In essence, patriotism makes civil religion
stronger allowing for it to become the mode of life.
Citizens are called upon to put into practice what they publicly stand for. Citizens are
characterised by the choices they make and the ends they constantly confront
determine choice. It seems Rousseau's aim here is to determine a mode of life that
would make citizens masters of their wills as opposed to victims of them (Barnard
1984,254). Thus, Barnard argues:
What crucially matters about the general will of citizenship, on Rousseau's own showing,
is not simply that it be upheld but that it be questioned so that it could reply. It seems
therefore, that just as there can be no true political action without will, so likewise there
can be no true political will without the possibility of accounting for the way it chooses
(1984,254).
Although his contemporaries did not take patriotism seriously, Rousseau was
doubtful that citizenship could generate the political commitment needed for his civil
religion to prosper. It is because of this that Rousseau puts importance on the
intrinsic reasoning of sentiment in patriotism. He does so because he believes that
inhabitants will hold laws in higher esteem if they hold affection (amour propre) to
their fatherland, which will ultimately cause civil religion to prosper. By going this
route, Barnard argues that Rousseau undermined the power of reasoning as a
determining force in politics (1984,244).
Patriotism, as explained in the Considerations of the Government of Poland, can be
achieved through education. Rousseau writes:
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It is education that must give souls the national form, and so direct their tastes and
opinions that they will be patriotic by inclination, passion, necessity. Upon opening its
eyes, a child should see the fatherland, and see only it until his dying day (Rousseau
1997[1782]. 189).
Education allows men to be free and be bound by the laws of the fatherland.
Rousseau argues that true republicans loved the laws and freedoms of their
fatherland and this love was moulded into them from an extremely young age .. .'with
his mothers milk' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 189). He talks about the specific
knowledge every child should know by a specific age. For example, he argues that
'...at fifteen he (a Pole) should know its (Poland) entire history, at sixteen all of its
laws.. .' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 189). Equality in education is also considered
important for patriotism and ultimately civil religion. Rousseau detested the
difference between the education of the rich and the poor. He argued that since the
constitution regarded everyone as equals, the education system should be no
different. If the civil religion proposed by Rousseau was to become the 'bible' of the
people, each inhabitant needed to properly understand its principles and, equality in
education was the best method to bring this about. Rousseau also believes that
education will cause Poles to 'respect laws which flatter its noble pride, which will
make and keep it happy and free; extirpating from its breast the passions that elude
the laws, it will foster those that cause them to be loved ... ' (Rousseau 1997[1782],
192-193). According to Lincoln, Rousseau critics make the mistake of believing that
he advocated re-creating the state. On the contrary,
He does not consider such action as possible, since after the state has been instituted, its
form of government may only be altered. He would regenerate its members by education
and training until they had the same qualifications as those which the original units
possessed. They would then be sufficiently wise to select the most advantageous form of
government, and national prosperity would be assured (1897:61).
The problem of basing the pursuit of justice on taking 'men as they are' is that
although individuals may unite their powers, their wills become divided. This is
important since a properly functioning civil religion requires the unification of the
wills. Hence, in order for the unification of wills to occur, morals must work in tandem
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with what the laws prescribe. The unification of the wills requires the passion of
love, the type Rousseau refers to as amour propre. The general will becomes a
significant pursuit when individuals attain the virtue of patriotism since patriotism is
the 'public-spirited devotion to the common good' (Gourevitch 1997, xxii). In the
Considerations for the Government of Poland, Rousseau says:
Only a patriotism enlightened by experience can learn to sacrifice for the sake of the
greater goods (general will) a brilliant right grown pernicious through abuse, and
henceforth inseparable from that abuse (Rousseau 1997[1782], 216).
In classifying laws for the civil religion, Rousseau places importance on the patriotic
symbols of beliefs, habits and a people's fundamental practices. He talks about
these patriotic symbols assisting the country in reviving the constitution once current
laws become outdated.
Which is the state's genuine constitution; which daily gathers new force; which, when the
other laws age or die out, revives or replaces them, and imperceptibly substitutes the
force of habit for that of authority. I speak of morals, customs, and above all of opinion; a
part [of the laws] unknown to our politicians but on which success of all others depends...
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 81).
The importance of both patriotism and citizenship for the effective functioning of the
civil religion should be quite apparent by now. Both must be viewed as reinforcing
elements of Rousseau's civil religion thoughts without which it cannot function
appropriately. The next section shall deal with the importance of the lawgiver for an
effective civil religion.
Lawgiver
Rousseau's civil religion necessitates a superior being (Lawgiver) to regulate laws.
to have the necessary foresight. and to declare them in the appropriate instance. He
places tremendous emphasis on the wisdom of the lawgiver to pursue the
aforementioned tasks. Rousseau writes of the pre-requisites and tasks of the
lawgiver:
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To discover the best rules of society suited to each nation would require a superior
intelligence who saw all of man's passions and experienced none of them, who had no
relation to our nature yet knew it thoroughly, whose happiness was independent of us
and who was nevertheless willing to care for ours; finally, one who, preparing his distant
glory in the progress of times, could work in one century and enjoy reward in another. It
would require gods to make laws (Rousseau 1997[1762], 68-69).
The lawgiver should aim to deeply entrench fundamental patriotic habits, tastes and
dispositions of the populace by placing emphasis on citizens' religion, morals and
unique lifestyles. Rousseau argues that good lawgivers
Sought bonds that might attach the citizens to the fatherland and to one another, and
they found them in distinctive practices, in religious ceremonies which by their very
nature was always exclusive and national, in games which kept the citizens frequently
assembled, in exercises which increased their pride and self-esteem together with their
vigour and strength in spectacles which by reminding them of the history of their
ancestors, their misfortunes, their virtues, their victories, stirred their hearts, fired them
with a lively spirit of emulation, and strongly attached them to the fatherland with which
they were being kept constantly occupied (Rousseau 1997[1782], 181).
From the discussion of the lawgiver thus far, it is evident that he should be an
extraordinary being. Rousseau further argues that a lawgiver should be capable of
transforming the fundamental nature of people. 'He (the lawgiver) should take from
his own forces in order to give him forces which are foreign to him and of which he
cannot make use without the help of others' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 69). In short, the
lawgiver should take away from the natural inclinations of people and help them
develop new ones. He believes that the more these natural forces decrease, the
more the acquired forces increase and the longer the acquired forces last thus the
more unyielding and longer a government can last. These acquired forces Rousseau
refers to are the forces that transform individuals into interdependent beings. He
writes: 'so that when each citizen is nothing and can do nothing except with all the
others' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 69). Legislation can also be said to have achieved its
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most perfect stage when the force acquired by human beings as a whole is greater
than the sum of all individuals' natural forces.
The position of lawgiver is independent of, and holds no similarities with human
society since 'he who has command over men ought not to have command over the
laws, so neither should he who has command over the laws have command over
men' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 69). If the contrary situation were to prevail, this would
result in severe injustices and particular views taking precedence over general
views.
The mission of the lawgiver is to 'attach the citizens to the fatherland' and this is
done through a civil religion. They (the lawgiver) should 'resort to the intervention of
heaven and to honour the Gods with their own wisdom' and make the people realise
that 'he (the lawgiver) proclaims himself their interpreter' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 71).
Rousseau speaks about the great lawgivers of the past such as Numa, Moses and
Muhammad and how they used religion to mould the societies they governed over.
With respect to Muhammad, Rousseau says:
Muhammad had very sound views, he tied his political system together very well, and as
long as his government endured under the Caliphs who succeeded him this government
was strictly unitary, and in this respect good (Rousseau 1997[1782], 145).
Nevertheless, he argues that once they passed away, their people corrupted its
belief systems and ultimately their societies crumbled.
In essence, a good lawgiver needs to transform individuals into patriotic beings
through equal education, good legislation and wisdom. With patriotic individuals,
good citizens and good lawgivers, the various components of Rousseau's civil
religion ideas are slowly falling together. The next component involves the doctrine
of separation of powers.
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Separation of powers
The powers of the lawgiver should be carefully controlled. There should be a
separation of powers between the lawgiver and the sovereign with the former
charged with enacting laws and the latter commanding them. Rousseau says that
'he who drafts laws has, then, or should have no legislative right' (Rousseau
1997[1762], 70). Rousseau talks about the dangers of uniting the legislative and the
sovereign authority citing Rome as an example. Those who enact laws should play
no part in the legislative. He writes:
Rome in its finest period witnessed the rebirth of all crimes of tyranny in its midst, and
found itself on the verge of perishing, for having united the legislative authority and the
sovereign power in the same hands (Rousseau 1997[1762], 70).
The sovereign cannot implement laws because its purpose is to attend to matters of
general concern and not laws that are of particular importance. It cannot allow one
part of the sovereign to implement laws since Rousseau argues that the sovereign is
inalienable. As soon as the sovereign tends towards a particular will (in effect having
two sovereigns), the body politic dissolves. This is because the particular will tends
towards partiality and the general will towards equality. Sovereignty is also indivisible
according to Rousseau. Will is either general (unanimous, any exclusion negates
generality) or not. Sovereignty should be the declaration of the general will for it to
be regarded as law. Rousseau regards the particular will as an act of decree at best.
The responsibility of implementing laws should thus be given to the magistrates or
government in the sense that Rousseau conceived of them (Gourevitch 1997, xxiv).
The government is merely a minister of the sovereign. With this discussion in mind,
Rousseau formulates a definition of government as an:
Intermediate body established between subjects and sovereign so that they might
conform to one another, and charged with the execution of the laws and the maintenance
of freedom, both civil and political (Rousseau 1997[1762], 83).
Government then is the 'legitimate exercise of the executive power' and, members of
the government are magistrates and are 'charged with that administration'
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(Rousseau 1997[1762], 81). It is important to make the distinction between the
sovereign and government. The difference between government and the state is that
the state is independent whilst the government exists by virtue of the sovereign. The
general will imposes limitations on the sovereign's actions to concern only the
general will, whilst the government cannot tend towards generality (Masters 1968,
336). Rousseau writes of the three different 'wills' present in the individual of the
magistrate. He says:
First: the individual's own will, which is solely to his particular advantage; second, the
common will of the Magistrates which is exclusively concerned with the advantage of the
Prince, may be called the corporate will, which is general in relation to the government
and particular in relation to the state of which the government is a part; in the third place,
the will of the people or the sovereign will, which is general in relation both to the state
considered as a whole, and to the government considered as part of the whole
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 87).
Rousseau argues that rigid laws can sometimes be to the detriment of the state
since their effect may become null and void. However, suspending laws must only
be done in extraordinary circumstances where there is a tremendous danger to the
public order. Rousseau says that 'one should never suspend the sacred power of the
laws except when the salvation of the fatherland is at stake' (Rousseau 1997[1762],
138). Rousseau advocates for dictatorships (not in the modern usage of the term) in
this special case scenario. He writes that the government should be concentrated in
the hands of a few members when the form of administration is in danger and not
the laws. Nevertheless, if the laws are an impediment to dealing with the crisis, then:
A supreme chief is named who silences all the laws and provisionally suspends the
sovereign authority; in such a case the general will is not in doubt, it is obvious that the
people's foremost intention is that the state not perish. This way of suspension of the
legislative authority does not abolish it; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it
speak, he dominates it without being able to represent, he can do everything, except
make laws (Rousseau 1997[1762], 138-139).
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In a perfect situation, the general will should be dominant, but on the con
trary (in
practice) the particular will is the strongest. Because of this, Rousseau a
rgues that
the number of magistrates to the government should be smaller in relatio
n to the
number of subjects to the sovereign.
The separation of powers between the government and the sovereign is
threatened
in two ways. Firstly, the sovereign may attempt to hold onto the functions
of the
government whilst the government may encroach upon the sovereignty a
nd slowly
take it over.
The distinction between the sovereign and government raises the questi
on of the
type of government suited to a country. Rousseau subsequently discuss
es the
various forms of government. Aristocracy as entrusting government to th
e hands of a
selected few and monarchy is the concentration of government in the ha
nds of a
single person. He considers democracies to be most well suited for smal
l states,
aristocracies for states of a medium size and monarchies for states that
are very
large.
Discussing democracy, Rousseau argues that there should be a separat
ion of
powers between the legislative and the executive. He writes that 'it is not
good that
he who makes the laws execute them' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 91). He is
quick to
point out that true democracy has never existed since it goes against the
usual order
the more govern and less be governed. Rousseau believes it to be impra
ctical that
citizens constantly assemble to deal with affairs of the state. He also writ
es that too
many things need to fall into place perfectly for a democracy to be a real
ity. Firstly,
the state needs to be small so that the populace can easily assemble to
deliberate of
public affairs. Secondly, there needs to be equality in terms of rank and f
ortune and
finally, there should be little or no luxury in society since he believes it co
rrupts both
the rich and poor. In summing up his views of democracy, Rousseau wri
tes that 'if
there were a people of Gods, they would govern themselves democratica
lly. So
perfect a government is not suited to men' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 92).
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Although arguing that monarchies are best suited for large states, Rousseau points
out one major defect that will always make monarchies inferior to aristocracies or
democracies. He speaks about the major corruption present in monarchies of the
day in terms of wealth and resources. He believes that this major defect will result in
a monarchy never able to run efficiently and which will eventually lead to its demise.
In the Letter to Mirabeau, Rousseau rebuffs monarchies arguing that there is no
evidence to back-up legal despotism. He writes that no evidence exists in natural law
in favour of monarchies and the maxim 'let the salvation of the people be the
supreme law', will not considered important by a monarchy (Rousseau 1997[1782],
269). Rousseau argues that Mirabeau's preference for monarchical rule does not
take into consideration the feelings and emotions of humans and is more suited to
utopia but 'worthless for the children of Adam' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 270). In short,
Rousseau views democracies and monarchies as susceptible to dictatorships and
ruin.
Elective aristocracies
The final component of Rousseau's ideas on civil religion is his preference for
elective aristocracies. An aristocracy is a form of government where leaders
assumed their position on the basis of wealth, age, family prominence and so on.
Rousseau says that there exists a natural, elective and hereditary form of aristocratic
governance and favours an elective aristocratic government since he believes that
governments should restrict leaders to a minority of people, all of whom are there by
virtue of elections. Rousseau discusses two methods of elections, election by choice
and election by lot. He argues that election by lot is more suited to a democracy and
voting is suitable for an aristocracy. To put this into perspective Rousseau says:
If one keeps in mind that the elections of chiefs is a function of government and not of
sovereignty, one will see why election by lot is more in the nature of democracy, where
the administration is all the better in proportion as it as its acts are fewer (Rousseau
1997[1762], 125). Furthermore: In aristocracy the prince chooses the prince, the
government perpetuates itself by itself, and that is where voting is appropriate (Rousseau
1997[1762], 126).
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However, Rousseau says that election by lot is only suited to a genuine democracy
and as stated earlier, there are no genuine democracies. He uses the example of
Venice to demonstrate a city that uses a mixture of these two types of election
methods. Rousseau argues that election by choice should be utilised to fill the
positions that require skilled personnel such as in the military, and elections by lot
should be utilised in filling positions that require virtues such as justice, integrity and
good sense. He gives the example of the judiciary where election by lot will be
advantageous.
Moreover, as opposed to a democracy:
Assemblies (in aristocracies) are more easily convened, business is discussed better,
and dispatched in a more orderly and diligent fashion, the state's prestige is better upheld
abroad by venerable senators than by an unknown and despised multitude (Rousseau
1997[1762],93).
In short, Rousseau argues that the most intelligent should govern the masses
though he is critical of aristocracies to a certain extent arguing that it requires virtues
such as 'moderation amongst the rich and contentment among the poor', which are
inconceivable in practice (Rousseau 1997[1762], 94). Although being critical here,
Rousseau argues that the inequality in wealth is a small price to pay in exchange for
governance by those who can devote all their time and energy to it. Masters
(1968:303) argues that Rousseau is not concerned with utopia but rather with finding
a form of administration that is legitimate in different forms of society. Rousseau
states:
Hence the question, which is absolutely the best government, does not admit to a
solution because it is indeterminate: or, if you prefer, it has many good solutions as there
are possible combinations in the absolute and the relative positions of people (Rousseau
1997[1762], 104-105).
Gourevitch argues that Rousseau's discussion of elective aristocracy 'seeks to
combine and reconcile popular sovereignty with wisdom' (1997, xxv).
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A summary of the important elements of Rousseau's civil religion ideas is needed.
Patriotism, good citizenship, a good lawgiver, the doctrine of separation of powers
and an elective aristocracy are the key components of Rousseau's civil religion ideas
and hence are of paramount importance for its effective functioning. The importance
of patriotism and how it is related to the creation of good laws and good citizenship
has already been discussed. In short, it is important because it links directly to the
question of civil religion and its role in the maintenance of order. Good patriots and
citizens lend themselves to the state. It is the responsibility of the lawgiver through
education, laws and wisdom to transform individuals into patriotic beings. A
separation of powers is also important to Rousseau's civil religion thoughts since it
allows each element of the civil religion not to be improperly influenced by the next.
The final component is an elective aristocratic form of government. Rousseau
believed that governance should be entrusted in the hands of those who could
devote all their time and energies to it and this would only be possible through an
elective aristocracy.
For all the above components to fall into place, Rousseau desired to make religion
important to the state and therefore the individual. In the Social Contract, Rousseau
occupied himself with the political sphere of religion since it makes obligatory an
individual's responsibility as a member of the state. In the Letter to Montaigne,
Rousseau argues that his civil religion arguments concern 'those aspects of religion
which concern public welfare and social morality, the duties of man and the citizen,
which came under the jurisdiction of government' (cited in Cobban 1934, 83). By
placing these issues under the jurisdiction of the state, Cobban argues that
Rousseau is not referring to the executive but rather the superiority of the body
politic acting through the general will (1934,83).
Re-visiting civil religion
As mentioned extensively in this chapter, Rousseau regards the dogmas of civil
religion to be extremely important for good citizenship. The articles of civil religion
are also needed for the optimum functioning of society. He again becomes radical in
his thought here by arguing that these articles should be imposed on society without
consultation with them. In essence, the people do not have a say in the pillars of civil
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religion. They merely have to be loyal subjects to it (Cristi 1997, 29). It is worth
stressing that Rousseau's principal aim is political and not religious. To summarise
Rousseau's intentions in the formulation of his civil religion arguments, Cristi writes:
In short, Rousseau's answer to the problem of legitimation and social solidarity in the
modern world, is the creation of a national civic religion, capable of binding all individuals
to the state (1997, 31).
Rousseau's chapter on civil religion goes into more detail concerning the problems
outlined in his discussion of the lawgiver. Rousseau groups religion under 'political
right' in view of the fact that he believes that the social contract will not be taken
seriously and not be regarded as binding if it has no foundation. As mentioned in the
earlier discussion of civil religion, this foundation, according to Rousseau, needs to
be religion since every state has been formed with religion as its foundation.
Rousseau also views religion as a political ri9ht because the problem arises as to
how to bring together popular sovereignty and religion. He is extremely critical of the
relevance and claim of outward forms of worship, agrees with Hobbes in this regard,
and argues that the dividing of sovereignty is evident in Christianity as a whole
(Beiner 1993, 618). Rousseau writes:
Hobbes is the only one who saw clearly the evil and the remedy, who dared to propose
reuniting the two heads of the eagle, and to return everything to political unity, without
which no state or government will ever be well constituted. But he first must have seen
the domineering spirit of Christianity was inconsistent with his system, and that the
interest of the priest would always be stronger than that of the state (Rousseau
1997[1762],146).
After all the aforementioned discussion, Rousseau provides a precise definition of
what he means by a civil religion. He says:
Existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and provident divinity, the life to
come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the Social
Contract and the laws (1997[1762],150-151).
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Rousseau's desire to make religion subservient to the state was common amongst
all philosophers of the Enlightenment though they all did not believe some form of
religion was important to maintain order in society (Cobban 1934, 78-79).
Rousseau's civil religion thoughts are something that makes its priority the moral
development of citizens. It is because of this fact that his thoughts posed a threat to
the status quo. Cobban writes:
The right of the church to lay down the principals of social behaviour could only be
challenged with any possibility of success, as has been said more than once, by
something more catholic than itself, and this rival could only be the idea of the community
as a whole, conceived as the supreme authority over his own life (1934,79).
Rousseau's discussion on civil religion provides a practical understanding of how
sovereignty should and shouldn't work. Rousseau outlines the different types of
religious societies that have existed. 'Religion of the priest', 'of the citizen' and 'of
man' are three variations of religion, according to Rousseau (Cristi 1997, 23).
Religion of the priest, according to Rousseau, divides the loyalties of individuals.
Man is given 'two legislations, two chiefs, two fatherlands' (Rousseau 1997[1762],
146). Roman Catholicism (its strict outward forms of worship) is singled out for
particular criticism here. Roman Catholicism entails sharing of authority between the
church and state. Rousseau argues that since individuals cannot decide where their
loyalties lie (Le. with the state or religion), their loyalties clash and this destroys
social harmony (Cristi 1997, 23). He writes that ever since the separation of the
church and state, 'no one has ever succeeded in settling the question of which of the
two, the master or the priest, one is obliged to obey' (Rousseau 1997[1762],145).
Rousseau says that this sort of religion is:
So manifestly bad that it is a waste of time to amuse oneself demonstrating that it is.
Everything which destroys social unity is worthless: All institutions which put man in
contradiction with himself are worthless (Rousseau 1997[1762],147).
In addition to this, Rousseau argues that priests may attempt to usurp temporal
authority and as a result go against the state's authority.
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Rousseau comes to discuss the religion of man. Here he is referring to Christianity.
He says that 'through this saintly, sublime, genuine religion, man, as children of the
same God, all recognise one another as brothers, and the society that unites them
does not dissolve even at death' (Rousseau, 1997[1762], 147). The shortcoming of
this religion, however, is that it does not hold individuals accountable to the state. On
the contrary, individuals are to withdraw themselves from earthly affairs, which
Rousseau believes damages the social spirit (Cristi 1997, 25). He writes:
But thus religion, since it has no particular relation to the body politic, leaves the laws with
only the force they derive from themselves without adding any other force to them, and
hence one of the great bonds of particular societies remain without effect. What is more;
far from attaching the citizens' hearts to the state, it detaches them from it as from all
earthly things. I know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit (Rousseau 1997[1762],
147).
Christianity also concerns itself with the formation of the Kingdom of God, which
made the distinction between religion and secularity. The state was therefore,
'ceasing to be one, and caused the intestine divisions which have never ceased to
convulse the Christian people' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 146). Cristi believes that
disputes between secular and religious authorities were an impediment to the unity
of society (1997,22). These can be further separated into two types. These are the
'fairly inclusive, local civil religion of Roman and other paganisms, and the more
universalistic and therefore imperialistic theocracies of Islam and Judaism' (Beiner
1993, 618). Pagan beliefs do not make the separation between church and state.
Each state had its 'own cult and its Gods' and did not separate its 'God and its laws'.
Political wars were theological in nature since the 'provinces of the Gods were, so to
speak, fixed by the boundaries of nations' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 143).
Finally, Rousseau comes to the religion of the citizen. He borrows from Machiavelli
(whose influence on him is quite marked) and argues that this has benefits since it
'extends the rights and duties of man as far as its altars' (Rousseau 1997[1762],
146). At the same time Rousseau is also sceptical since he writes that this was
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founded on 'lies and terror' and may lead to a situation of intolerance, tyranny and
insecurity (Cristi 1997, 23).
Cristi believes that there are similarities between Rousseau's civil religion thoughts
and 'religion of the citizen' and uses the metaphor of 'political siblings' to refer to
them (1997, 32). She nevertheless argues they are both susceptible to political
abuse and may lead to fanaticism, extremism, tyranny or terrorism. In the Geneva
Manuscript, Rousseau does argue that 'the advantages of the religion of man and
the citizen will be combined. The state will have its cult and will not be the enemy of
anyone else's (Rousseau 1997[1758], 150). Rousseau eventually removes this from
the Social Contract, and Beiner argues that he was correct in doing so because this
project was overambitious (1993,634).
Rousseau makes the important distinction between his thoughts on civil religion and
Christianity. He regards Christianity as a religion for slaves and not free individuals.
He says that 'true Christians are made to be slaves, they know it and are hardly
moved by it, this brief life has too little value in their lives' (Rousseau 1997[1762],
149). Rousseau repeats this understanding in the Letter to Usteri in 1763 where he
disputes the fact that Christianity has the answer to society's problem. On the
contrary, he believed that it destroys the unity of the body politic.
The civil religion thoughts of Rousseau have often been accused of being radical.
Gourevitch (2007, xxvii) argues that the last two beliefs of the civil religion tradition
seem to be the most radical. These proclaim the superiority of the social contract
and the laws therein. To elucidate this further, Gourevitch says the fact that the
sovereign is inalienable and indivisible and that the church has no true claim to
political authority can be interpreted as radical (2007, xxvii).
Rousseau's thoughts on civil religion have also been accused of being radical since
Rousseau argues that the sovereign may banish individuals who do not profess
these civil articles of religion. The manner in which an individual acts is the clearest
evidence of whether or not he should be banished from the state. Individuals are not
banished because they are not pious, but because they do not wish to sincerely
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obey and love 'laws, justice, and, if need be of sacrificing his life to his duties'
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 150). In addition to this, if a hypocrite acknowledges the
laws but does not obey them, Rousseau believes they should be put to death
because they have disobeyed the laws and hence committed a grave sin.
From Rousseau's perspective, this 'forced to be free' phrase seems extremely
important. This is because the sovereign (who is the only judge of conflicts) needs to
protect those citizens that abide by laws from those who violate them. Masters goes
on to explain this in the context of warfare. He poses the question that if individuals
entered civil society to protect self-preservation, how individuals can be obligated to
sacrifice their lives for the country? (Masters 1968, 330). The most stringent test of
citizenship is an individual's enthusiasm to die for his country. Rousseau believes
that citizens must think of their lives as a gift, a gift that is conditional on them being
willing to sacrifice their lives for the betterment of the state. Rousseau says that
'whoever wants to preserve his life at the expense of others ought also to give it up
for them when necessary' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 64). The individual's right to self-
preservation also extends to safety from foreign attack. On the other hand, the
general will (as mentioned above) obligates citizens to sacrifice their lives for the
betterment of the country (Masters 1968, 330). The individual, therefore, cannot
'enjoy the rights of a citizen without fulfilling the duties of a subject' (Rousseau
1997[1762],53).
Rousseau talks about the ills of the invention of money and commerce. He argues
that the state is in ruin as soon as 'public service ceases to be the citizens' primary
business' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 113). He also says 'finance is a slaves word ... in a
truly free state the citizens do everything with their hands and nothing with money'
(Rousseau 1997[1762], 113). In The Discourses, Rousseau's main premise is that
commerce has corrupted human beings by taking their attention away from public
duty and towards materialism. In our desire to gain recognition and reputation for our
works, we have lost virtue (Keohane 1980, 426). This is further echoed in The
Considerations of the Government of Poland, were he says that 'the citizen should
be kept constantly occupied with the fatherland, for it to be made their principal
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business, for it to be continuously before their eyes' (Rousseau 1997[1782], 185).
Rousseau believes that this will be done through his civil religion.
Rousseau brings up the notion of censorship in chapter seven book four of the
Social Contract. He states that 'censorship maintains morals by preventing opinions
from being corrupt, by preserving their uprightness through wise applications,
sometimes even by fixing when they are still indeterminate' (Rousseau 1997[1762],
141). Nonetheless, this in no way means that public opinion should be constrained.
Despite the fact that Rousseau's thoughts on civil religion might seem to contain
elements of radicalism, it also rejects the issue of intolerance, be it civil or
theological, although he regards them as the same thing. He allows for tolerance of
others who do not profess the civil religion as long as their articles of faith do not
affect their duties as a citizen
In his discussion of tolerance as a precept of civil religion, Rousseau argues that 'the
dogmas of this religion are only of concern to the state' (Rousseau 1997[1762], 150).
In agreeing to the Social Contract, citizens agree rationally to join for the betterment
of all. Yet in basing this contract to some extent on faith rather than on reason, we
might argue that citizens sacrifice the rationality and civil freedom that are the
purpose for forming the social contract in the first place. Rousseau advocates for
freedom of belief and worship as long as it 'does not harm others'. In addition to this,
he says that 'it certainly matters to the state that each citizen has a religion which
makes him love his duties'. According to Cobban (1934,88), civil religion is the
'sphere in which he calls on the individual to make the greatest sacrifices to the state
of which he is a member'. It seems that Rousseau's principal purpose was to release
the individual from the grasp of priesthood and make him obligated to follow the
dictates of the state alone. In the Letter to Voltaire and the Social Contract,
Rousseau argues that intolerance will result in certain people subjecting those who
they believed to be damned to treatment they believed is in store for them (the
damned) in the next life. Rousseau says that 'indeed the faithful are rarely inclined to
leave reprobates in peace in this world; and a saint who believes himself to be living
with the damned readily pre-empts the devils work' (Rousseau 1997[1763], 245). He
argues that the best possible world would contain
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Positively, the social maxims that everyone would be bound to acknowledge, and,
negatively, the fanatical maxims one would be bound to reject, not as impious but as
seditious. Thus, every religion that could conform to the code would be allowed; every
religion that could not conform to it would be proscribed; and everyone would be free to
have no other religion except the code itself (Rousseau 1997[1763], 245).
Rousseau's ideas are in sharp contrast to the secular ideas of Spinoza presented in
the previous chapter. Spinoza argued for a society that placed more emphasis on
reason than faith. He argued that we lose our freedom when we become slaves to
our emotions. Emotions such as pleasure and pain should not be forces out of our
reach or be seen as external forces because this will result in us being lead away
from freedom (Pitts 1986, 23). Spinoza also writes in Ethics V, Prop 6: 'the mind has
greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, insofar as we come to
understand all things necessary' (Spinoza 1955[1677], 250). This means that as
individuals understand and seize control over the real causes of their emotions, they
lessen the pressure their emotions exert on them since they are exerting the power
of their intelligence. Ultimately this will result in freer individuals and a freer society.
It is clearly evident from Rousseau's entire discussion that he better understood the
innate nature of human beings as individuals whose emotions play an intricate part
in their everyday lives. Paying careful attention to the context of eighteenth century
Enlightenment Europe, Rousseau realised that any alternative form of society
required the presence of both religion and secularity. He believed that he had
successfully negotiated the tough terrain between the two with his ideas on civil
religion.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed Rousseau's alternative ideas on the relationship
between the state and religion in the Enlightenment era. In view of the fact that
Rousseau believed that no state had ever been formed without religion serving as its
foundation, he decided to attach his ideas on a civil religion, although not on a
monotheistic religion such as Christianity or Islam. This relationship is one in which
civil society was based on the civil principals of patriotism, good citizenship, a good
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lawgiver, separation of powers and an elective aristocracy. He hoped that patriotism
and good citizenship would reinforce his civil religion ideas and ultimately result in
peace and harmony in society. Patriotism would play the role of intrinsic reasoning of
sentiment whilst citizenship would be based on discursive reasoning. Although
Rousseau believed in the superiority of citizenship (discursive reasoning), he was
not confident that it would alone be able to inspire his thoughts on civil religion to
prosper. He believed that patriotism would be able to fill this void since it is based on
unconditional love for one's fatherland. Rousseau further believed that his
arguments on civil religion provided the educational and moral culture for citizens to
act virtuously through the general will. A good lawgiver would ensure that this is the
case. The doctrine of separation of powers would allow for the independence and
most effective functioning of the important elements of the civil religion. Finally, an
elective aristocracy would be the most suitable form of government for his thoughts
on civil religion since governance would be in the hands of people who could
dedicate the majority of their time and energy to it.
This was a far cry from French society that was characterised by an absolute
monarchy. It was absolute in the sense that the monarchy was the final interpreters
of divine laws; they decided what was in the public's best interests and possessed
the right to ask of anything from the French people. France is about the only place
that comes close to creating a kind of 'civil religion', and that is because the existing
religious order took such a battering during the French Revolution. Although the idea
of civil religion is not original, Rousseau's conception of it is unique and of great
significance. Rousseau subsequently came under tremendous religious attacks but
his theories later became fatal to theological claims to power. The form of
secularisation advocated by Rousseau was an important theory to analyse hoping
to arrive at the broader question of the dissertation.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation I have discussed two important, yet different ways of l
ooking at
the relationship between religion and the state in the Enlightenment era.
The
thoughts of John Locke, Benedict de Spinoza and Jean Jacques Rousse
au were
analysed with regards to their understanding of the most appropriate arra
ngement
between religion and the state. Locke and Spinoza articulated their unde
rstanding
with reference to toleration, although the two thinkers differed markedly w
ith regards
to their respective understanding of the term. In short, Locke belonged to
the
moderate wing of the Enlightenment whilst Spinoza was extremely radica
l in his
thought.
The foundation of the moderate thinkers concerned freedom of worship a
nd the
peaceful coexistence of private churches alongside those that were appo
inted by the
public. The radicals on the other hand, demanded freedom of thought an
d
expression, simultaneously with the expression of ideas deemed to be cl
ashing with
the fundamental system of belief of revealed religion (Israel 2001, 265). L
ocke's
theory of toleration revolves around freedom of worship and theological d
ebate,
placing minute importance on freedom of thought and speech. Locke dis
tinguished
between an individual's private and public life. He believed that freedom
of thought
and belief belonged to an individual's private life whilst issues concerning
the state
belonged to the individual's public life. On the other hand, Spinoza views
freedom of
thought, speech and even the press as the most important goals, wherea
s saving
souls plays no part in his conception of toleration. Spinoza also believed
that a
democratic government was the best arrangement for his ideas on tolera
tion to
prosper.
This dissertation also investigated the relationship between toleration an
d property
and it was concluded that the right to private property is the key to Locke
's political
philosophy. Locke believed that his theory of private property is importan
t for the
movement of rights and freedoms from the religious viewpoint to that soc
iety where it
is based on and secured by political arrangements. In essence, whilst Lo
cke argued
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in favour of a theological conception of toleration, he was adamant that t
here should
be a separation of church and state with anything concerning an individu
al's public
duty confined to the public realm.
Locke imposed three limitations on this theory of toleration. Firstly, the ci
vil
magistrate need not tolerate any thoughts and opinions that are contrary
to the
social spirit. Secondly, Locke does not grant toleration to Catholics beca
use they
hold allegiance to the pope and not the civil magistrate as deemed neces
sary. In the
last instance, toleration is not afforded to atheists in view of the fact that
oaths,
promises and covenants, which are the fundamental bonds of human so
ciety
according to Locke, would have no bearing on them. Spinoza only impos
ed one
limitation on his version of toleration. He argued that toleration is not exte
nded to
those who hold seditious thoughts since this would be detrimental to the
well being
of a state.
Upon critical analysis, I have concluded that the principal reason for the
Lockean
version of toleration gaining wider approval is that most Enlightenment th
eorists
were not willing to accept a version of toleration that was not in harmony
with the
main tenets of divine religion. Hence, it is the era in which Spinoza lived
and wrote
and not his radical toleration ideas per se that resulted in the subordinati
on of his
views by his contemporaries. The fact that he even advocated for freedo
m of speech
and press is a phenomenal achievement in itself. Freedom of speech an
d the press
now form the backbone of most constitutions in the contemporary era. Th
e
international community describes countries that do not allow for these fr
eedoms as
authoritarian, absolutist, or dictatorial.
On the contrary, Locke's version of toleration stayed firm on the core ten
ets of
Christianity, therefore having no problem in gaining widespread acceptan
ce in the
context of seventeenth century Enlightenment Europe. Locke's understa
nding of
toleration is considered by many as the foundation of most Western secu
lar states in
the contemporary era. The theological conception of toleration was Lock
e's answer
to the peaceful relationship between religion and the state. Some comme
ntators
have even argued that the Two Treatises laid the groundwork for democ
racy in the
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contemporary era as well as for the constitution of the United States of A
merica.
Commentators have come to this conclusion because of the doctrines of
separation
of powers and checks and balances mentioned by Locke that governmen
ts should
adhere to. With respect to checks and balances, Locke states that 'it is n
ecessary
there should be a power always in being which should see to the executi
on of the
laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and exe
cutive
powers come often to be separated' (Locke 1988 [1688], 365).
This dissertation has also investigated Rousseau's conception of the opt
imum
relationship between religion and the state. He argued that since the form
ation of
every state had religion as its foundation, any future state needs religion
as well.
Rousseau nevertheless emphatically opposed pagan and prophetic relig
ions,
especially Christianity because he believed that it would have detrimenta
l effects on
constitutions. The religion Rousseau had in mind was a religion of civil p
rincipals,
what he termed as a civil religion. Rousseau argued for total adherence
to the
principals outlined in the Social Contract since this would maintain peace
and order
in society. He believed that all individuals are born free and any arrangem
ent of
society needs to consider this indisputable fact.
The discussion of Rousseau's political philosophy provided the basis for
his civil
religion arguments. On the issue of government and the sovereign, Rous
seau wrote
that the executive of the government should be an intermediary body bet
ween
citizens in their sovereign capacity and as subjects bound by law, and is
always
comprised of the people's representatives. The sovereign is general in e
nactments
whilst the exercising of executive power occurs with regard to particular
instances.
I carried out an analysis of the general will because it is the key to Rouss
eau's
theory. This is his term for the exercise of popular sovereignty. The gene
ral will is
understood as both the public interest that the sovereign of every state o
ught to
promote and the individual will of each citizen to achieve that interest. Th
e latter form
was often in contradiction with a person's particular interest. This collecti
on of
particular interest is what Rousseau calls the will of all. This should not b
e confused
with the general will since the general will looks at common interests whi
lst the
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particular will looks to private interests of citizens, and in effect is nothing more than
the sum of particular wills.
Rousseau placed particular importance on patri otism and good citizenship for the
effective functioning of his civil religion. Given the innate nature of human beings
(driven by lust, pride, vanity and so on), Rousseau believed citizenship alone could
not result in a successful civil religion since it was based on discursive reasoning.
Thus, he believed that since patriotism is based on intrinsic reasoning of sentiment
(unconditional love for one's fatherland), it could supplement citizenship therefore
resulting in a successful civil religion and subsequently a peaceful society. Moreover,
the presence of a good lawgiver, the doctrine of separation of powers between the
lawgiver and the sovereign and an elective aristocracy were also important for his
ideas on civil religion. The lawgiver should be an extraordinary being able to attach
an individual to the fatherland using patriotic habits, tastes, and prepositions. The
doctrine of separation of powers ensures that there is no abuse of power by the
lawgiver and sovereign thereby ensuring that the civil religion prospers. He wrote
that the people who make the law should not execute them since this would confuse
public and private interest. Finally, Rousseau distinguished between a monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy. He believed that all were dangerous for different
reasons discussed in the dissertation. Ultimately, Rousseau preferred an elective
aristocracy because the people who are trusted with governmental affairs are
suitably talented and possess the time to dedicate their talents to the state on a full
time basis.
Rousseau wrote the Social Contract and his other works a few decades before the
French Revolution and this dissertation will also conclude with an analysis of the
revolution in relation to Rousseau. The French Revolution is perhaps the most
commentated and analysed event in the history of modern politics. Some argue that
the French Revolution laid the foundations for democracy and its institutions in
Europe. Some theorists who have analysed Rousseau in relation to the French
Revolution argue that he in fact advocated for revolution, whilst others argue that his
thoughts unintentionally influenced the revolution. Since this dissertation is
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interested in analysing texts and ideas, we don't need to know the exact intentions
his works.
Rousseau's suggestions in The Considerations of the Government of Poland are
clear evidence of the fact that he was not of a man who advocated for revolution as
a method of replacing a government (Lincoln 1897, 64). In it he writes:
Before working on the execution of the project (reforming the Government of Poland),
one should first inquire whether it will succeed ...Ah! I cannot repeat it too often; think
carefully before you lay your hands on your laws, and above all on those that made you
what you are (Rousseau 1997[1772],193-194).
It is correct to argue that Rousseau played an instrumental role and perhaps inspired
France and the rest of the world towards new political ideals. He received numerous
accolades and honours and Robespierre referred to him as the theorist who made
reason and virtue triumph in an extremely corrupt and volatile century (Furet 1997,
168). The victors of Thermidor (who decided to transfer Rousseau's remains to the
Pantheon) became the people who would later contest Rousseau's influence on the
revolution. As it stood, for the majority of the nineteenth century, Rousseau was the
centre of interpretation of the French Revolution (albeit from critics and admirers).
Furet states that Rousseau's dominance was as if one could predict the revolution in
its entirety (Furet 1997, 172). Rousseau was a theorist who hoped to redefine man
from a corrupt, materialist, and unhappy perspective to one that lived in happiness,
respected the liberty of people and lived in peace and harmony. This project of
regeneration of humankind is what attached him to the French Revolution. As Furet
puts it:
It is by virtue of the project of regeneration that the revolution belongs to Rousseau. Like
him, the revolutionaries wished to create a new man. It was in pursuing that project that
the revolution underwent successive liberal and illiberal periods that mirrored the
ambiguity between the egalitarian process of republican politics and the authoritarian
method of creating a new man (1997,179).
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Indeed, it is perhaps also correct to argue that the French Revolution might not have
followed the course it did if Rousseau was not around. Nevertheless, it is entirely
inappropriate to argue that Rousseau was the inciter of the French Revolution. I
have thus concluded that Rousseau's influence on the French Revolution is minimal
with most theorists agreeing that he did not intend to promote revolution. Many
scholars have reasoned like de Maistre, 'Rousseau, feeble, timid and decrepit, never
had the will or the power to stir up revolt' (cited in Melzer 1983, 297). Rousseau's
thoughts nevertheless provided an important spur for an alternative way of thinking
about religion and the state both in the French Revolution and beyond.
As mentioned in the introduction, we are experiencing a return of the sacred
amongst political theorists and amongst society. Discussing the foundations of
secularity has put me in a better position to analyse the return of the sacred, albeit at
another level of academia.
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